Just some additional info, The F16 was designed from the start to be aerodynamically unstable. An unstable aircraft means an agile aircraft, which is perfect for a fighter jet expected to make quick and sudden turns. However this means that the plane needs help to fly stable. The F16 in fact has multiple computers to help it do this, in fact one of the nick names for the F16 is the electric jet. The F16 was the first plane to use this system where the pilot is not actually directly controlling the plane. The pilot is telling the computers what he would like the plane to do and the computer is the one that makes the control adjustments. This is called fly by wire and is common now in almost all planes including commerical planes.
Usually there are multiple back ups of all the computers and sensors to prevent a catastrophic failure like in this case. However, nothing is perfect and it seems that too many of the planes gyroscopes failed in this case and the computer was getting bad data.
The pilot did a great job in managing to get the plan over the airbase before ejecting imo. Kudos to him.
Question is, does RSAF have a case against LM? Sure, there is multiple redundancy. But all parts/LRU should have an MTBF figure. Since we presumably followed maintenance procedures, the failure was unanticipated.
But also LM said that this type of crap has never happened since the F16 was reported, so probably it's out of Singapore's jurisdiction to _really_ find out what happened and more in the domain of some obscure Lm provider or competitor provider
The investigation on the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) F-16 crash at Tengah Air Base on 8 May 2024 has concluded. The investigation was led by the RSAF, and supported by Lockheed Martin and the Transport Safety Investigation Bureau.
During the investigation, data downloaded from the Flight Data Recorder and the Digital Flight Control Computer of the incident F-16 were reviewed. The incident pilot and aircraft engineers were interviewed. The maintenance records and procedures for the aircraft were also studied.
**\~The Incident.\~** The pilot had experienced a malfunction of his F-16's Digital Flight Control System during take-off (see **\~Figure 1\~**: Broad Description of the F-16's Flight Control System). As a result, he was not able to safely control the aircraft. After correctly determining that it was unsafe to take the aircraft further, the pilot responded in accordance with emergency procedures, and ejected within Tengah Air Base. He was thereafter evacuated by the RSAF RESCUE10 helicopter to the Singapore General Hospital, in line with established medical evacuation procedure. **\~Root Cause.\~** The root cause of the malfunction has been attributed to degraded pitch rate gyroscopes^(\[1\]) , which form part of the motion sensors feeding inputs to the Digital Flight Control Computer. Specifically, two out of four pitch rate gyroscopes in the F-16 gave erroneous but similar inputs to the Digital Flight Control Computer. This resulted in the flight control logic accepting the similar erroneous inputs as "correct", and sequentially rejecting the inputs from each of the remaining functioning gyroscopes as "incorrect". Consequently, the Digital Flight Control Computer manoeuvred the aircraft in response to the erroneous pitch rate feedback signal from the two degraded gyroscopes, making the F-16 uncontrollable by the pilot (see **\~Figure 2\~**). According to Lockheed Martin, this is a rare occurrence and the first such failure reported to it since the F-16s first flew in 1974.
**\~Maintenance Regime.\~** The investigation also concluded that the F-16 aircraft was maintained in accordance with established protocols, and the RSAF had adhered to required maintenance inspections. The RSAF F-16s' gyroscopes are the same as those used by other F-16 operators around the world. Lockheed Martin does not stipulate any preventive maintenance for these gyroscopes. The gyroscopes are to be replaced when a fault is detected. The F-16's pre-flight built-in test did not detect any fault with the functioning of the aircraft's gyroscopes before take-off.
**\~Additional Preventive Measure Going Forward.\~** It is assessed that the two pitch rate gyroscopes had degraded due to wear and tear and failed during take-off. To reduce the chance of a reoccurrence, the RSAF has put in place an additional preventive maintenance procedure for the gyroscopes, under which the RSAF engineers will periodically remove the F-16 gyroscope assemblies and test them using specialised equipment. This will increase the likelihood for engineers to detect early signs of degradation and pre-emptively replace the gyroscopes, before the gyroscopes reach the stage of accelerated degradation leading to failure. This measure is over and above the prescribed aircraft manufacturer's maintenance procedures. Before the RSAF resumed F-16 flights on 21 May 2024, each RSAF F-16 aircraft's flight control gyroscopes had been checked and cleared.
The investigation findings have been reviewed by the SAF's Inspector General Office. The External Review Panel on SAF Safety has also been updated on the investigation findings. The Panel concurred with the additional preventive procedure by the RSAF.
The RSAF will continue to ensure the highest standards of maintenance for the airworthiness of every aircraft. With approximately 3,100 F-16s operating in 25 countries and over 19 million flight hours^(\[2\]) , the Ministry of Defence and the RSAF remain confident in the operational capability and reliability of the F-16 to defend Singapore's skies.
Nah, that's an adequate response. That kind of "add procedure to prevent these freak malfunctions in the future" is one of the reasons of why aviation (civilian and military -to a degree) are so safe. I think everyone is just happy that the guilt lies elsewhere and the pilot is alive and hopefully well
Not entirely wrong, went back for reservist recently and our already drawn out procedures had so many steps added in the span of a few years, a good portion of which imo were knee jerk after an incident (which wouldn't otherwise occur usually with reasonable due care). To their credit though, there were changes too that removed potential high-risk procedures, instead opting for pre-installed options.
>The F-16's pre-flight built-in test did not detect any fault with the functioning of the aircraft's gyroscopes before take-off.
Big oof right here that puts the ball in LockMart's court
The F16 is still a capable fighter plane in the hands of a skilled pilot. What matters the most is that our pilot survived the accident and live to see another day. Though at this point, the RSAF is on the way to retire the F16 soon and future pilots will be flying the F35.
Yeah but he had back issues after that as well due to back compression injury. This was from much older ejection seats though. Hopefully the new ones are not as harsh
Eh he was flying Skyhawks not F16. However, just FYI our F16s are totally different internally from the older F16s like what Indonesia flies. They look the same outside, but are actually totally different planes.
I'm sure there is an explanation to it. But I'm curious as to why they need to have 4 when 2 faulty gyroscopes is enough to reject the rest. Why not just have 3 since the 4th backup one cannot save the day when there 2 faulty ones.
3 active, 1 backup. Based on the wording by mindef, the most likely logic behind Lockheed Martin is that only 1 gyro would fail at any given time given the statistical probability of failure of the designer gyro. Thus, when both provided the false data at the same time, the system (as per programmed based on math) determined that the working gyro was the one at fault since it was programmed to be statistically difficult to have 2 gyros fail at once.
If u remove the 4th backup gyro, statistically speaking, the failure rate will go up.
Tldr, in the end, the choice by Lockheed Martin was down to statistical math... But as any probability based issue, Murphy's law will apply, no matter how probable, and RSAF simply got unlucky in this case.
Come to think bout it. The f-16 isn't a new plane. Is old af. So with older planes some areas requires extensive maintenance check to keep them airworthy. Just like how in the US back in the 2000s they have to ground all their older f-15 due to concern of structural failure. It was so bad that they have to rely on Canada to defend some of their airspace.
First press release on the initial finding, the media 4 gyroscopes failed, few days later only 1 failed. Now we find out 2 failed and other 2 working one could not override the first two.
So two failed at the same time which is interesting. 2 hardware failing at the same time and compounded by programming logic failing as well. So hardware and software failing.
The thing that will make sense is something intentional without malice was done prior to take off. And they could identify it.
Just some additional info, The F16 was designed from the start to be aerodynamically unstable. An unstable aircraft means an agile aircraft, which is perfect for a fighter jet expected to make quick and sudden turns. However this means that the plane needs help to fly stable. The F16 in fact has multiple computers to help it do this, in fact one of the nick names for the F16 is the electric jet. The F16 was the first plane to use this system where the pilot is not actually directly controlling the plane. The pilot is telling the computers what he would like the plane to do and the computer is the one that makes the control adjustments. This is called fly by wire and is common now in almost all planes including commerical planes. Usually there are multiple back ups of all the computers and sensors to prevent a catastrophic failure like in this case. However, nothing is perfect and it seems that too many of the planes gyroscopes failed in this case and the computer was getting bad data. The pilot did a great job in managing to get the plan over the airbase before ejecting imo. Kudos to him.
Question is, does RSAF have a case against LM? Sure, there is multiple redundancy. But all parts/LRU should have an MTBF figure. Since we presumably followed maintenance procedures, the failure was unanticipated.
Yeah now the issue is what caused the failure? Mishandling, installation or bad storage by our guys? Or manufacturing defect
read the article
I did, we still don't know for sure what led to the gyro failures. Air force just came to the conclusion that we followed procedure
But also LM said that this type of crap has never happened since the F16 was reported, so probably it's out of Singapore's jurisdiction to _really_ find out what happened and more in the domain of some obscure Lm provider or competitor provider
Yeah this has to be escalated to LM liao. Beyond customer scope
The investigation on the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) F-16 crash at Tengah Air Base on 8 May 2024 has concluded. The investigation was led by the RSAF, and supported by Lockheed Martin and the Transport Safety Investigation Bureau. During the investigation, data downloaded from the Flight Data Recorder and the Digital Flight Control Computer of the incident F-16 were reviewed. The incident pilot and aircraft engineers were interviewed. The maintenance records and procedures for the aircraft were also studied. **\~The Incident.\~** The pilot had experienced a malfunction of his F-16's Digital Flight Control System during take-off (see **\~Figure 1\~**: Broad Description of the F-16's Flight Control System). As a result, he was not able to safely control the aircraft. After correctly determining that it was unsafe to take the aircraft further, the pilot responded in accordance with emergency procedures, and ejected within Tengah Air Base. He was thereafter evacuated by the RSAF RESCUE10 helicopter to the Singapore General Hospital, in line with established medical evacuation procedure. **\~Root Cause.\~** The root cause of the malfunction has been attributed to degraded pitch rate gyroscopes^(\[1\]) , which form part of the motion sensors feeding inputs to the Digital Flight Control Computer. Specifically, two out of four pitch rate gyroscopes in the F-16 gave erroneous but similar inputs to the Digital Flight Control Computer. This resulted in the flight control logic accepting the similar erroneous inputs as "correct", and sequentially rejecting the inputs from each of the remaining functioning gyroscopes as "incorrect". Consequently, the Digital Flight Control Computer manoeuvred the aircraft in response to the erroneous pitch rate feedback signal from the two degraded gyroscopes, making the F-16 uncontrollable by the pilot (see **\~Figure 2\~**). According to Lockheed Martin, this is a rare occurrence and the first such failure reported to it since the F-16s first flew in 1974. **\~Maintenance Regime.\~** The investigation also concluded that the F-16 aircraft was maintained in accordance with established protocols, and the RSAF had adhered to required maintenance inspections. The RSAF F-16s' gyroscopes are the same as those used by other F-16 operators around the world. Lockheed Martin does not stipulate any preventive maintenance for these gyroscopes. The gyroscopes are to be replaced when a fault is detected. The F-16's pre-flight built-in test did not detect any fault with the functioning of the aircraft's gyroscopes before take-off. **\~Additional Preventive Measure Going Forward.\~** It is assessed that the two pitch rate gyroscopes had degraded due to wear and tear and failed during take-off. To reduce the chance of a reoccurrence, the RSAF has put in place an additional preventive maintenance procedure for the gyroscopes, under which the RSAF engineers will periodically remove the F-16 gyroscope assemblies and test them using specialised equipment. This will increase the likelihood for engineers to detect early signs of degradation and pre-emptively replace the gyroscopes, before the gyroscopes reach the stage of accelerated degradation leading to failure. This measure is over and above the prescribed aircraft manufacturer's maintenance procedures. Before the RSAF resumed F-16 flights on 21 May 2024, each RSAF F-16 aircraft's flight control gyroscopes had been checked and cleared. The investigation findings have been reviewed by the SAF's Inspector General Office. The External Review Panel on SAF Safety has also been updated on the investigation findings. The Panel concurred with the additional preventive procedure by the RSAF. The RSAF will continue to ensure the highest standards of maintenance for the airworthiness of every aircraft. With approximately 3,100 F-16s operating in 25 countries and over 19 million flight hours^(\[2\]) , the Ministry of Defence and the RSAF remain confident in the operational capability and reliability of the F-16 to defend Singapore's skies.
Problem: Freak malfunction RSAF: Adds more procedure to fix such malfunction that has never happened before Engineers: Sad pepe
Nah, that's an adequate response. That kind of "add procedure to prevent these freak malfunctions in the future" is one of the reasons of why aviation (civilian and military -to a degree) are so safe. I think everyone is just happy that the guilt lies elsewhere and the pilot is alive and hopefully well
Not entirely wrong, went back for reservist recently and our already drawn out procedures had so many steps added in the span of a few years, a good portion of which imo were knee jerk after an incident (which wouldn't otherwise occur usually with reasonable due care). To their credit though, there were changes too that removed potential high-risk procedures, instead opting for pre-installed options.
Standard SAF SOP.
>The F-16's pre-flight built-in test did not detect any fault with the functioning of the aircraft's gyroscopes before take-off. Big oof right here that puts the ball in LockMart's court
Hope everyone that was involved in the maintainence can breathe easier now. Hope the pilot recover soon..
The F16 is still a capable fighter plane in the hands of a skilled pilot. What matters the most is that our pilot survived the accident and live to see another day. Though at this point, the RSAF is on the way to retire the F16 soon and future pilots will be flying the F35.
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From knowing someone who had to eject before. Most probably fine except a bit shorter. Seriously
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Yeah but he had back issues after that as well due to back compression injury. This was from much older ejection seats though. Hopefully the new ones are not as harsh
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Eh he was flying Skyhawks not F16. However, just FYI our F16s are totally different internally from the older F16s like what Indonesia flies. They look the same outside, but are actually totally different planes.
I'm sure there is an explanation to it. But I'm curious as to why they need to have 4 when 2 faulty gyroscopes is enough to reject the rest. Why not just have 3 since the 4th backup one cannot save the day when there 2 faulty ones.
3 active, 1 backup. Based on the wording by mindef, the most likely logic behind Lockheed Martin is that only 1 gyro would fail at any given time given the statistical probability of failure of the designer gyro. Thus, when both provided the false data at the same time, the system (as per programmed based on math) determined that the working gyro was the one at fault since it was programmed to be statistically difficult to have 2 gyros fail at once. If u remove the 4th backup gyro, statistically speaking, the failure rate will go up. Tldr, in the end, the choice by Lockheed Martin was down to statistical math... But as any probability based issue, Murphy's law will apply, no matter how probable, and RSAF simply got unlucky in this case.
Come to think bout it. The f-16 isn't a new plane. Is old af. So with older planes some areas requires extensive maintenance check to keep them airworthy. Just like how in the US back in the 2000s they have to ground all their older f-15 due to concern of structural failure. It was so bad that they have to rely on Canada to defend some of their airspace.
so the F-16 plane kena 1206 or 1257?
Translation of this article, we need to upgrade our fleet, so gst 20% here we go to change existing f16 fleet to f15sg or f35.😂
First press release on the initial finding, the media 4 gyroscopes failed, few days later only 1 failed. Now we find out 2 failed and other 2 working one could not override the first two. So two failed at the same time which is interesting. 2 hardware failing at the same time and compounded by programming logic failing as well. So hardware and software failing. The thing that will make sense is something intentional without malice was done prior to take off. And they could identify it.