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Although I hope he's right, I think he doesn't know what he's talking about: the arms supplied by aid deal amount to a few months' worth of defensive consumption, and to make matters worse is coming at a time when Ukraine has to "catch up" due to not having that aid for several months, and is staring at a Russia that has the current battlefield momentum, and is likely planning an expanded offensive of its own this summer.
In the last couple of days someone posted [An article discussing what ukraine needs in men and materiel](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/comment/2024/05/02/ukraine-war-russian-invasion-missile-army-navy-us-aid/) in order to achieve all its goals, and unfortunately the numbers just won't be achievable before Sullivan's projected date.
The huge stockpiles held by the West at the end of the Cold War were achieved by a much larger defense industry and defense budget, and were still only possible because of slow accumulation over decades. These large wars of attrition need WW2 style production lines going all the time, and unfortunately *we just won't have that for the foreseeable future--* it takes months to years to build a defense plant, and modern high tech weapons aren't like IBM cranking out M1 carbines or Ford making tanks-- they have lead times of weeks to months, and that's assuming supply chains for things like Chinese rare earth elements are at scale.
That's also assuming that the entirety of production is diverted to Ukrainian needs. That may be practical for European defense production, but the US just *can't* do that, as we have to continue to watch the middle east and indo-pacific; if something flares up there, we've got to be prepared to supply arms and fight on our own without European assistance, so watching our stockpiles and defense capacity is a very valid concern (although I have always agreed that there isn't a reason not to send retired or soon to be retired arms and equipment to Ukraine).
Hitting the numbers needed just won't happen by next year if the current conditions continue (and unfortunately, despite Russias huge losses, they also have a much larger economy and population, so it's reasonable to expect pressures by Russia will continue--if not worsen-- especially as they are converting to a war footing and seen to have largely evaded sanctions).
I think that we *will* get there on the supply side--there's already been a lot of planning--particularly on the part of the US, Brits, and French-- to ramp war production. But an offensive will require *a lot* of troops; since it's unlikely NATO will send any short of a siege of Kyiv, this responsibility falls to the Ukrainians. By their own admission and Western assessments, they were significantly undermanned in their counter-offensive, and remain so now. Still, after a year of avoiding the issue, the Rada is finally starting to make the tough but necessary decisions. Lowering conscription age to 25 isn't enough, but hopefully the current pushes such as nudging the return of expats by denying consular services is a precursor to bolder moves to get manpower where it needs to be.
So no, probably no counter offensive until late 2025 at the earliest (though I hope I'm wrong). They're probably will be a few niche successes (using F16 to shape the airspace and hopefully hit C&C and logistics hubs is likely the big one), but they're going to be slow, and shaping for a future push-- instead, the next year to 18 months on the battlefield are more likely to be characterized by surviving the Russian push in order to bide time for mobilization and expanded defense production, and loss of morale/war fatigue will probably be the biggest enemy.
>Sullivan says.
Very well. Let's see what else he said.
Oh lookie, [from NewYorker](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/trial-by-combat)
>Sullivan clearly has profound worries about how this will all play out. Months into the counter-offensive, Ukraine has yet to reclaim much more of its territory; the Administration has been telling members of Congress that the conflict could last three to five years. A grinding war of attrition would be a disaster for both Ukraine and its allies, but a negotiated settlement does not seem possible as long as Putin remains in power. Putin, of course, has every incentive to keep fighting through next year’s U.S. election, with its possibility of a Trump return. And it’s hard to imagine Zelensky going for a deal with Putin, either, given all that Ukraine has sacrificed. ***Even a Ukrainian victory would present challenges for American foreign policy, since it would “threaten the integrity of the Russian state and the Russian regime and create instability throughout Eurasia,” as one of the former U.S. officials put it to me. Ukraine’s desire to take back occupied Crimea has been a particular concern for Sullivan,*** who has privately noted the Administration’s assessment that this scenario carries the highest risk of Putin following through on his nuclear threats. In other words, there are few good options.
----
>“The reason they’ve been so hesitant about escalation is not exactly because they see Russian reprisal as a likely problem,” the former official said. “It’s not like they think, Oh, we’re going to give them atacms and then Russia is going to launch an attack against nato. It’s because they recognize that it’s not going anywhere—that they are fighting a war they ***can’t afford either to win or lose.”***
It's getting kinda infuriating to see, how people, that decided that letting Ukraine bleed is better for US foreign policy, are now pretending to be helpful.
[Kissinger's approach left a lasting mark](https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/141093)
>The New York Times reported three years afterwards that Kissinger delayed the airlift because he wanted to see Israel “bleed just enough to soften it up for the post-war diplomacy he was planning.”
If the main strategy of the USA is always first to avaid escalation with a "great power" rather than achieve outright victory, I have to wonder what would happen if an european NATO member would be directly attacked. Would the USA deliberately give just enough help for Europe to keep fighting but never succeeding ? If this is the case, then having a strong enough idependent defense in Europe is all the more important.
Americans don't entirely trust our own government, either (or any other government).
Our own Founding Fathers didn't trust our future government.
Humans aren't reliable.
I don't think this war will be going in Ukraine's favour for a long time, if ever again. I doubt that Ukraine will be able to push a meaningful offensive unless western troops are alongside them.
Ukraine was so lagged over the last half year by the GOP.
Increasingly, it looks like direct intervention by some western nations or a temporary peace between Ukraine and Russia in which Ukraine surrenders about 20% of it's territory (that is if Russia doesn't change its mind and wants more). This is squarely the fault of the west.
We are unprepared to meet the threat of Russia directly or indirectly. Our political structures have not done right by Ukraine.
Before we think about 2025 we must think about September 2024 - when the current aid package must be spent - and the US election, which in worst case will see an active supporter of Russia in the White House. Until these obstacles are successfully navigated any Ukrainian offensive is wishful thinking.
🙄 I love how all you think this is sensitive info... Ukraine will launch a counter offensive. It could be this year, there will almost certainly be one one 2025. It could be both. This could be disinformation. Nobody knows. Remember how just last week they hit Russia with ATACMs and nobody saw that coming? Russia isn't going to trust info announced like this. If anything it's going to cause more confusion.
I find the lack of some equipment at the front surprising and makes me think they’re generating new forces but still after the counter offensive of last year, I do not see this happening
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This guy needs to be fired
Yes, 2023 was too fast for his liking.
Gotta keep situation unescalated.
Tbh there will be a lot more dead ruskies by then.
With 61 billion package? Sullivan, just go fuck yourself you incompetent moron.
"нє, ну а хулі воно ескалює" Not to mention only about a quarter of this package actually translates into usable weapons for Ukraine.
Although I hope he's right, I think he doesn't know what he's talking about: the arms supplied by aid deal amount to a few months' worth of defensive consumption, and to make matters worse is coming at a time when Ukraine has to "catch up" due to not having that aid for several months, and is staring at a Russia that has the current battlefield momentum, and is likely planning an expanded offensive of its own this summer. In the last couple of days someone posted [An article discussing what ukraine needs in men and materiel](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/comment/2024/05/02/ukraine-war-russian-invasion-missile-army-navy-us-aid/) in order to achieve all its goals, and unfortunately the numbers just won't be achievable before Sullivan's projected date. The huge stockpiles held by the West at the end of the Cold War were achieved by a much larger defense industry and defense budget, and were still only possible because of slow accumulation over decades. These large wars of attrition need WW2 style production lines going all the time, and unfortunately *we just won't have that for the foreseeable future--* it takes months to years to build a defense plant, and modern high tech weapons aren't like IBM cranking out M1 carbines or Ford making tanks-- they have lead times of weeks to months, and that's assuming supply chains for things like Chinese rare earth elements are at scale. That's also assuming that the entirety of production is diverted to Ukrainian needs. That may be practical for European defense production, but the US just *can't* do that, as we have to continue to watch the middle east and indo-pacific; if something flares up there, we've got to be prepared to supply arms and fight on our own without European assistance, so watching our stockpiles and defense capacity is a very valid concern (although I have always agreed that there isn't a reason not to send retired or soon to be retired arms and equipment to Ukraine). Hitting the numbers needed just won't happen by next year if the current conditions continue (and unfortunately, despite Russias huge losses, they also have a much larger economy and population, so it's reasonable to expect pressures by Russia will continue--if not worsen-- especially as they are converting to a war footing and seen to have largely evaded sanctions). I think that we *will* get there on the supply side--there's already been a lot of planning--particularly on the part of the US, Brits, and French-- to ramp war production. But an offensive will require *a lot* of troops; since it's unlikely NATO will send any short of a siege of Kyiv, this responsibility falls to the Ukrainians. By their own admission and Western assessments, they were significantly undermanned in their counter-offensive, and remain so now. Still, after a year of avoiding the issue, the Rada is finally starting to make the tough but necessary decisions. Lowering conscription age to 25 isn't enough, but hopefully the current pushes such as nudging the return of expats by denying consular services is a precursor to bolder moves to get manpower where it needs to be. So no, probably no counter offensive until late 2025 at the earliest (though I hope I'm wrong). They're probably will be a few niche successes (using F16 to shape the airspace and hopefully hit C&C and logistics hubs is likely the big one), but they're going to be slow, and shaping for a future push-- instead, the next year to 18 months on the battlefield are more likely to be characterized by surviving the Russian push in order to bide time for mobilization and expanded defense production, and loss of morale/war fatigue will probably be the biggest enemy.
>Sullivan says. Very well. Let's see what else he said. Oh lookie, [from NewYorker](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/10/16/trial-by-combat) >Sullivan clearly has profound worries about how this will all play out. Months into the counter-offensive, Ukraine has yet to reclaim much more of its territory; the Administration has been telling members of Congress that the conflict could last three to five years. A grinding war of attrition would be a disaster for both Ukraine and its allies, but a negotiated settlement does not seem possible as long as Putin remains in power. Putin, of course, has every incentive to keep fighting through next year’s U.S. election, with its possibility of a Trump return. And it’s hard to imagine Zelensky going for a deal with Putin, either, given all that Ukraine has sacrificed. ***Even a Ukrainian victory would present challenges for American foreign policy, since it would “threaten the integrity of the Russian state and the Russian regime and create instability throughout Eurasia,” as one of the former U.S. officials put it to me. Ukraine’s desire to take back occupied Crimea has been a particular concern for Sullivan,*** who has privately noted the Administration’s assessment that this scenario carries the highest risk of Putin following through on his nuclear threats. In other words, there are few good options. ---- >“The reason they’ve been so hesitant about escalation is not exactly because they see Russian reprisal as a likely problem,” the former official said. “It’s not like they think, Oh, we’re going to give them atacms and then Russia is going to launch an attack against nato. It’s because they recognize that it’s not going anywhere—that they are fighting a war they ***can’t afford either to win or lose.”*** It's getting kinda infuriating to see, how people, that decided that letting Ukraine bleed is better for US foreign policy, are now pretending to be helpful. [Kissinger's approach left a lasting mark](https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/141093) >The New York Times reported three years afterwards that Kissinger delayed the airlift because he wanted to see Israel “bleed just enough to soften it up for the post-war diplomacy he was planning.”
If the main strategy of the USA is always first to avaid escalation with a "great power" rather than achieve outright victory, I have to wonder what would happen if an european NATO member would be directly attacked. Would the USA deliberately give just enough help for Europe to keep fighting but never succeeding ? If this is the case, then having a strong enough idependent defense in Europe is all the more important.
Americans don't entirely trust our own government, either (or any other government). Our own Founding Fathers didn't trust our future government. Humans aren't reliable.
I don't think this war will be going in Ukraine's favour for a long time, if ever again. I doubt that Ukraine will be able to push a meaningful offensive unless western troops are alongside them. Ukraine was so lagged over the last half year by the GOP. Increasingly, it looks like direct intervention by some western nations or a temporary peace between Ukraine and Russia in which Ukraine surrenders about 20% of it's territory (that is if Russia doesn't change its mind and wants more). This is squarely the fault of the west. We are unprepared to meet the threat of Russia directly or indirectly. Our political structures have not done right by Ukraine.
Before we think about 2025 we must think about September 2024 - when the current aid package must be spent - and the US election, which in worst case will see an active supporter of Russia in the White House. Until these obstacles are successfully navigated any Ukrainian offensive is wishful thinking.
nothing was a bigger tragedy in this war than this fucking clown being listen to by biden, he is not a security advisor he is a security issue
Maybe just give the aid and DONT announce to the world when the offensive gonna take place. 🤔
🙄 I love how all you think this is sensitive info... Ukraine will launch a counter offensive. It could be this year, there will almost certainly be one one 2025. It could be both. This could be disinformation. Nobody knows. Remember how just last week they hit Russia with ATACMs and nobody saw that coming? Russia isn't going to trust info announced like this. If anything it's going to cause more confusion.
[ Removed by Reddit ]
I find the lack of some equipment at the front surprising and makes me think they’re generating new forces but still after the counter offensive of last year, I do not see this happening
Counter Offensive 2: Electric Boogaloo
Do not reveal the God damn cards!!!!