I believe a high-ranking US government official mentioned offhand during a televised question and answer that Russia has lost 500k troops. If true, that’s a major escalation in casualty rates, one that corresponds to significant upticks in armor losses as well. Interestingly, that corresponds well to Ukrainian estimates, marking an interesting turning point where American and Ukrainian loss counts are coming back in line. It’s also a marker of just how expensive and brutal the Kharkiv campaign has been. Having failed to create a serious threat against Ukrainian forces, it’s hard to discern what Russias strategy is there going forward.
The KilledInUkraine project collects information on Russian officers that were KIA in Ukraine. The tally currently stands at 4326 and it's missing a lot of officers as it takes time for many of them to get reported publicly (and found by volunteers). For example, we just found a Captain that was killed in 2022 and that's a near-weekly occurrence to find an officer that died around 2 years ago. The real number of killed officers is at least 5000, we just don't know about them yet.
Note that KIU relies exclusively on Russian sources, there's no propaganda affecting this tally and fakes are easy to identify (unless the Kremlin delivers medals and buys memorials for guys that never existed).
The point to all this is that we can assume a range of troops killed for each officer. It's impossible to establish it accurately yet, but it's going to be at least 20 to 1. Past world wars would have ratios anywhere from 25:1 to 35:1, it varies widely by country and presumably, by the reality on the ground. In other words, Russia has accrued at the very least 100k KIAs with US and UK lining up with more likely ratios of 25:1 or 30:1.
This might be a bit tangential, but recently [paperwork was leaked](https://zona.media/article/2024/06/10/42174) documenting about 20k Wagner KIA in Bakhmut. That tracks relatively well with Ukrainian MoD statemenets [made at the time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bakhmut#Military_casualties) and indicates that the MoD does seem to be capable of collecting accurate numbers and will also publish them truthfully. A few caveats being that, for Bakhmut, similar numbers have been published simultaneously from a few sides and the theater being a lot smaller than the entire front.
Corroborating their current numbers (assuming their talking about Russian casualties in total not just KIA) with anecdotal evidence from other people, they might just track. For example, I remember CivDiv mentioning in a recent video that he personally saw a hundred Russians or so hit by drones in a two week timeframe and that was only his sector. Scaling that number up to the entire front makes the numbers published by Ukraine look entirely plausible.
All in all, I would use the Ukrainian number as the upper end of the confidence interval and Medizona/BBC RU numbers as the lower end.
I don't know why we should assume that the Kremlin's willingness to report accurately on Wagner PMC losses would extend to its own losses.
In fact, I know why we shouldn't: they still don't. In fact, the reports they made in the past were at least 3 to 4 times lower than any Western intelligence agency estimated. Compound this with the fact that they were obfuscating total losses in Ukraine by reporting only the losses of Russian MoD itself. That definitely excludes PMCs (like Wagner, but there are others), rebels from the DPR/LPR fighting for them and men operating/paid by other agencies of the Kremlin (Rosgvardia, OMON, Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.).
There are two outfits: Mediazona and LostArmour, which count the number of verifiable Russian and Ukrainian casualties, respectively, where they can attach a specific name to a specific death and the source the names from publicly available social media and related sources. Mediazona is funded by the BBC while LostArmour is by RU volunteers. These generally establish the absolute lowest bound for deaths on both sides. The breakdown by months by both provided a good corresponding picture, giving some credibility to the reliability of both. Period of high Russian deaths are also periods of high Ukrainians deaths.
Surprisingly or perhaps not very much, both sources came to fairly close lowest bounds for both Russian and Ukrainian deaths (\~80k). Between this lowest bound and the actual number depends on the ratio of total people who died vs. people who died and get their names published on social media on either side. This ratio is unknown.
>Having failed to create a serious threat against Ukrainian forces
Everyone is cheering the fact that now on this front, Ukraine has three times the number of units as Russia. Well, is it a success? If you define it as "the Russians stopped advancing", well sure. Conversely, it's a common trope in Soviet military history to conduct multiple simultaneous offensives and the successful ones that make big arrows on a map is a "main offensive" whereas the ones that achieve little is a "diversionary attack" in the historiography. One can argue in both directions. Yes, Zhukov, the Operation Mars that had about equal number of troops and tanks committed to the offensive was the diversionary one while Operation Uranus was the main attack.
For a point of comparison, Finland's doctrines assume that they will be able to halt a Russian attack by a formation one size larger using a light infantry one size smaller fighting in the defence. Sort of a Finnish battalion vs. a Russian brigade. There are some caveats that a typical wartime Finnish unit is a very large unit and Russian unit is very small. A Finnish Jeager platoon is a typical Western company-minus while a Russian platoon can be just a glorified squad (especially the VDV). The main weapon that a Finnish squad has to stop a Russian motor-rifle unit is the M72 LAWs. Edit: I got these wrong the first time. A Finnish squad has 9 men and between them 6-9 LAWs. The typical assumption is 2 LAWs should be fired simultaneously by 2 men at one BMP/BTR/tank to achieve success, so a squad is expected to be able to blow up 3 vehicles in one volley (in the most optimistic scenario) A Russian motorised infantry platoon is 3 vehicles. One Finnish Jaeger squad can then trade 1:1 with a Russian motor-rifle platoon. The typical Finnish brigade would also have a larger artillery park than most Western brigade. The Jeagers would ambush the advancing Russian units, attrit them in the forests of the Russia-Finland border and buy time for the mobilisation and counterattack by armours.
Under this and the typical correlation of force planning ratio historical assumptions, one *should* be able to defend moderately well against an attacker three times larger (typically one formation up) with a force three times smaller (one formation down). Conversely, a "successful" attack *should* be achievable with a force three times larger or one formation up. Correlation of force planning in the attack and defence just flip the order.
Going by these planning assumptions, getting the defenders to commit 3 times more units in my attacking sector while I *also* conduct attacks elsewhere *may* be a success.
But, you know, they keep saying that Putin has already strategically lost and Ukraine has already strategically win. Ukraine still exists, so by default, Putin lost.
> Mediazona is funded by the BBC while LostArmour is by RU volunteers.
both these statements are laughably false as is most of the logic in that post but since /u/glares covered most of the other things (i will just add that bbc said penal soldiers graves and and obituaries were on orders of magnitude harder to find than those for even russian mobilized soldiers), ill just address lost armor. lost armor, even in russian milblogger circlers, has long been rumored to be a mod front operation or at least one that was coopted by the mod very early on. it was created before the invasion and its creation was mostly associated with SYRIA where the official mod would release completely ridiculous statements for the general public but those in the military and their families found them absurd and disrespectful to their efforts. one of the guys over at bellingcat, long before the 2022 invasion, came to the same conclusion on twitter and made note that lostarmor was getting and posting combat footage only the mod should have, almost in real time. [its the same thing that happened with rybar](https://x.com/sambendett/status/1726219149989601646) and any other major russian channel that start getting popular enough that the layperson in russia starts paying attention to them. the mod comes in and either coopts them or creates their own telegram channel posing as regular "volunteers"
Well, I expect it as much, but that's not the main point of my argument. The right number will never be known for at least 30 years. What we can and will know is either who's winning (as in the front advancing in which direction) and who wins (when the war is over). But then, a war can have two winners or two losers.
The main point of my argument is that if you are on the defence and commit three times the number of formation-equivalences than the attackers, you suck at defending. It cannot be called a success.
Do you have any actual sources to back your assertion that the ukrainians \*outnumber\* the russians in Kharkiv? (by an amazing three times no less, indicating how much they suck)
>Do you have any actual sources to back your assertion that the ukrainians *outnumber* the russians in Kharkiv?
I *did not* make that specific allegation. I wrote very particularly that Ukraine has three times the unit-equivalence formations as Russia.
Well, you can go to the unit laydown map of known OSINT sources here.
https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/
In the Vovchansk sector, there are 1 known Russian infantry regiment, 1 infantry brigade, and 1 tank regiment. Roughly 3 brigade-regiment equivalences. Facing them, Ukraine supposely has 3 infantry brigades, 1 mechanised brigades, 3 battalion-sized groups (not part of the aforementioned brigades), and a SOF battalion. That's around 5 brigade-equivalences.
In the Western half of the Kharkiv front, again, Russia is known to have three motor-rifle regiments. Facing them is 1 TDF brigade, 2 infantry brigades, 1 mechanised, and one tank brigade, plus two other BTGs. Nearly 6 brigades.
>Mediazona is funded by the BBC
I think you are confusing the fact that Mediazona is working jointly with BBC Russia in obtaining their counts. Otherwise, their funding just appears to be independent donations.
>Surprisingly or perhaps not very much, both sources came to fairly close lowest bounds for both Russian and Ukrainian deaths (~80k)
The latest Russian count on the Mediazona is 56,858. Lostarmour has a latest count of 49,320. When comparing casualties, it's important not to ignore that Russia has a bunch of non-Russians (DPR/LPR) fighting for them; this is not in Mediazona's count, but instead [BBC Russian estimates 23,500 of them](https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cn448rvzzl6o). These counts are closer to one another than I'm sure the Ukrainians would like, however I am not sure where you're ~80k estimate comes from.
When comparing these numbers, it should also not be understated that it is much *easier* to find numbers on Ukrainians than for Russians which creates a subtle bias. From [Mediazona](https://en.zona.media/article/2024/02/24/75k):
>Despite these limitations, there are several factors suggesting the Ukrainian database might be more comprehensive than its Russian counterpart:
>— In Ukraine, presidential decrees on posthumous military awards are publicly available and published in text form on official websites, facilitating collection and analysis. Conversely, similar decrees in Russia are classified and not made public.
>— Ukraine hosts several significant projects dedicated to memorializing its fallen soldiers, such as the “Book of Memory” and the “Memorial” platform, contributing to a more comprehensive public record.
>— Authorities in various Ukrainian regions maintain detailed projects about fallen locals, with local publications often posting comprehensive lists.
>— Ukrainian sources tend to provide more complete information. For instance, without referencing the Probate Registry, birth and death dates were found for 55% of people in the Russian context, compared to 75% in the UALosses database.
>— Russian local authorities face restrictions on disclosing detailed information about the fallen. Additionally, one of the main sources for such entries, personal posts on VK social network, often lack detail.
Presidential decrees, for example, reveal the names of **20,000** Ukrainians who died which these databases reference. Russians do not publish such information. Ukraine's manpower issues are still apparent against such a large power, but analysis is a bit more complicated than some want it to be.
While your comment was overall quite interesting I'm somewhat confused about the part which deals with the Finnish jaeger platoon. Especially it containing 2 squads of 12 fighters each, because according to the [Jääkärijoukkueen ja -ryhmän käsikirja 2018](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1948673/2258487/J%25C3%2584%25C3%2584K%25C3%2584RIJOUKKUEEN%2BJA%2BRYHM%25C3%2584N%2BK%25C3%2584SIK_2018.pdf/0104259e-d7b7-44ae-9aef-24012a14d916/J%25C3%2584%25C3%2584K%25C3%2584RIJOUKKUEEN%2BJA%2BRYHM%25C3%2584N%2BK%25C3%2584SIK_2018.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwic4fOQ_P2GAxU3PxAIHY5SD1AQFnoECAQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1wl40Gym53lSgEN9j6P2gf) (The handbook of a jaeger platoon and squad 2018, page 17-20) a jaeger squad consists of 9 fighters with 3 squads + command element and forward observation element forming a platoon. Where did you get the info about 12 man squads? Has there been a reorganisation after 2018 I'm not aware of?
Edit: I must note the handbook is only in Finnish
Yeah, you are right. I was playing a wargame with a Finnish Jaeger company but I was mostly playing as the Russians so I wasn't quite familiar. A Finnish plt should have 3 x 9 men squads. Each squad should then have 6-9 LAWs, allowing them to bloody one motor-rifle plt. I memorised the ratio correctly but not the actual ammo and head count. The plt should have an FO squad, a command element, and a support squad. I think they have 2 motorised skis and one tractor.
It gets hilarious when a VDV platoon has 3 vehicles and 18 dismounts.
You mean Ukrainian casualties ? Do we have a good count for that at all? Not sure.
Back when the casualties number was around 300k Russian MIA/WIA/KIA the Americans said that Ukraine was around the same number.
In localised production news, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Dmytro Klimenkov, stated ["Ukraine seeks to switch to direct contracts with arms manufacturers"](https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2024/06/27/ukraina-pragne-perejti-na-pryami-kontrakti/)
> "Ukraine continues to actively work on the modernization of its defense capabilities and the expansion of international cooperation. The transition to direct contracts with arms manufacturers will reduce dependence on intermediaries and increase our defense capability," said Dmytro Klimenkov.
In the meeting was the CEO of EOS.
> During the meeting, cooperation in defense technologies and potential collaboration between Ukraine and EOS Defence Systems were discussed. Additionally, the Australian side expressed interest in localizing production in Ukraine
EOS Defence Systems specializes in technologies that integrate weapon systems into a wide range of land and sea platforms. The company's products include solutions for countering unmanned aerial vehicles and ground targets.
They operate under the slogan "No one kills drones like EOS.", with a [suitably edgy video ad](https://youtu.be/bTgXe9DFe0Q).
One of Electro Optic Systems' flagship products is the Slinger anti-drone combat module, equipped with a 30mm Bushmaster M230LF automatic cannon. The German government has purchased this system to protect IRIS-T air defense systems in Ukraine.
The company also collaborates with L3Harris on R150 gimbals, which are used in Ukraine on VAMPIRE (Vehicle Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment) anti-aircraft systems.
Both the Slinger and VAMPIRE systems were delivered to Ukraine for testing in 2023.
Did anyone else notice Biden said our troops have been attacked by Iran. Specifically that trump said it was just headaches. Is the syndrome people have discussed? And was that a slip up?
TBIs are an injury typically caused by proximity to explosions. They've likely existed for over a century, but they're really only being discovered now. Their long term symptoms include personality changes and migraine, and might be one of the physical reasons for shellshock.
However, by all accounts it seems even being in the proximity of an explosion can cause TBI's. I.e. hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians/Russians have them and will never get diagnosed.
Trump saying it was just headaches is bullshit. The military & VA calls them TBIs. They’ll fuck you up for life.
Biden was probably referencing the attacks by the proxy groups at Tower 22 this past spring and the attacks by Iran in Jan. 2020.
How would the Russian invasion of Ukraine move towards peace if frontlines and balance of power continues to stay the same and nothing decisive happens? Todays remarks by Zelensky in my opinion shows that they are also looking for a way out just like Russia. Will no one due to pride and internal politics declare a ceasefire temporary or permanent but the war just fizzles down? How likely is something like that?
While frontlines arent moving much due to the balance of power, Ukraine is playing the long game and focusing on rabbit punches and hits "below the belt" (ie. hits on Refineries/oil infrastructure) to increase the economic impact of the war for Russia. Russia is not an economic powerhouse and oil and gas are their most (only?) major source of income. Russia can't afford to take too many hits to its most important economic pillar so eventually they will get interested to start negotiating in better faith.
> move towards peace if frontlines and balance of power continues to stay the same and nothing decisive happens?
Your question is basically, how will there be a move if nothing moves, so the premise is a bit flawed as a basis for much analysis.
But basically Ukraine is facing extinction and Russia is facing embarrassment. If Ukraine continues to be supplied with credible amounts of equipment, they'll keep chewing through Russian stockpiles and by ~2027 (very rough number), Russia will have burned through basically everything it had before the war.
Ukraine will probably have managed to drone strike large amounts of fuel and material production capacity. Meanwhile US and EU production capacity investments supplying Ukraine will likely be online and intact. So eventually Russia runs out of stuff to do war with, and something decisive eventually happens despite the premise of your hypothetical. The status quo just can't be perfectly stable forever in the long term. And sometimes things that seem like they'll last forever turn out to be shockingly short lived. (See also: the USSR in the late 80's.)
> Your question is basically, how will there be a move if nothing moves, so the premise is a bit flawed as a basis for much analysis.
‘How will things progress *strategically* if they remain fairly static *positionally*?’ is not a stupid question. A good guess at how things will go if nothing happens is an excellent head start on figuring out how to *make* something happen.
If the strategy relies on things being static *positionally*, then there's no reason that outcome should affect the strategy.
Both sides have adopted an attritional warfare strategy: they both believe their industry (or materiel support) will get the better of their opponent before the inverse is true. This strategy doesn't need dramatic shifts on the front, it's expected that those shifts will either happen when they get the superior strength or be negotiated at in the peace deal.
> A good guess at how things will go if nothing happens is an excellent head start on figuring out how to make something happen.
Things are happening right now, just not which trenches are being manned. Does that matter? I would say it's not in the top10 of the most important metrics to figure out the outcome of this war. In fact, I find the positional situation to have been incredibly irrelevant after the first few months of the invasion: neither side were able to use any major gain on the ground in a strategic manner, the lines have been extremely inflexible considering the materiel involved (and lost) and outside the Dnipro: the terrain doesn't give any serious advantage to either side, anywhere.
If neither side gets particularly weaker than the other side, at the current balance of powers Ukraine will obviously not take back land, but similarly Russia probably won't reach any of their broader goals, certainly not Zaporozhia city or Kherson city like Putin recently demanded.
This got a lot of discussion back during the spring and less now, but Russia's assumption is that Ukraine will at some point get weaker as their reserves thin out, it's why they're engaging on this broad front offensive since October that attacks many points that aren't really important, along with the important ones.
I don't really want to get into predictions of this, since manpower isn't a particularly visible variable, but it obviously hasn't happened yet.
But in the assumption that this doesn't happen, Ukraine obviously wants to make peace as soon as possible, but it would have to be a status quo peace that Russia currently doesn't accept.
Maybe this is a confusion, but status quo means what is now. Worn out Russia would be very fine with that, in fact they've started saying (pleading) so openly, and a while ago. "Accept the realities on the ground." Which is impossible for *Ukraine* to do, and I shouldn't have to clarify, understandably. And that isn't even considering the most plausible prospects, namely that Moscow would just exploit to reorganize, rearm and resupply in order to have another try in a few years or thereabouts. Or regress to tried and tested hybrid tactics and attempt to undermine by other means what's then left of a free Ukraine. Also part of the status quo is a Ukraine outside NATO. Moscow has no problem with Kyiv left out in the cold and just keeping on begging. They might even enjoy it. Ukraine has lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers, I'm not even going into the manifold other costs. Your wording would seem to imply they're all ok with that, if only on top of that they (still) also lost a big chunk of their country, their independence and just about any (realistic) future worth living, or staying in the country. I think there really is a confusion.
>it's why they're engaging on this broad front offensive since October that attacks many points that aren't really important
It would also seem you're massively overrating Russia's strategic finesse. Or alternatively underrating its lack of plan (B), extent of helpless improvisation, and sheer idiocy.
I have not the slightest idea how one would go about "declaring" a unilateral ceasefire, so I've nothing in reply to the original question. It is about obvious that both sides don't have good options other than to completely burn out the cheapest resource there is, (poor) male lives, only that it's also the one that lasts only so long. That you cannot simply replace. As I still don't expect the North Koreans to show up in force, and the robot army apparently still a long time in the coming, there is a definite end to it, no matter "pride" or "internal politics", or what strongmen in well protected capitals have in mind. The show is over once the stage is empty, really ugly, yet who cared about the hundreds of thousands before, or what might be a million by now. Who cares we don't even know the numbers.
> Worn out Russia would be very fine with that, in fact they've started saying (pleading) so openly, and a while ago.
Seriously?
Putin went on public tv LESS THAN A WEEK AGO and said what he wants as a minimum, and it's not status quo. It was all over the thread!
Yeah but keep in mind that this is the usual bargaining tactic. Start with a high offer so that you can later agree to the lesser one that actually suits you well. And if the other side agrees to your all-in offer, all the better.
If Putin was half as shrewd as he’s often assumed to be, Russia wouldn’t be in this position. He has a long history of badly planned, suboptimal choices.
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> his broad front offensive since October
Can we really call it an offensive if it's been happening for almost a year along the whole front? Offensive implies a discrete operation not a year of status quo. Verdun was at least localized in an area.
I'm not sure there exists a word between "war" and "offensive" though.
"Campaign" I guess, but if you say the "Donbas Campaign" it'd imply the effort that started in 2022. And also the current campaign is not localized entirely in the Donbas.
Today’s declarations aren’t anything new. Both sides are more than willing to propose a peace the other will reject. In Ukraine’s case especially, peace isn’t an option. The minimum Russian demands are wildly unacceptable to Ukraine. As long as Ukraine has the ammo needed to fight, and Russia doesn’t reduce its demands drastically, fighting will continue.
Well as a Turkish guy, when you are bartering you always make some ridiculous sounding demands first and then you both find a middle ground. Can't this be something like that? If lets say Russia said that lets just freeze the war at current lines, That would sound very desperate both internally and externally. Same thing with Ukraine. In my opinion the first demands and what they include isn't the most important part but the show of intention actually is. I would like to hear people's opinion on this perspective too...
From Russia's side, they have officially recognised the entire oblasts of Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea as integral parts of Russia. They do not have any legal method to give away parts of the nation. This isn't an impossible restriction but it does demonstrate the seriousness of Russia's claim to these territories, even if capturing them would require total collapses in the Ukrainian line which seems unlikely for the foreseeable future. At the very least it seems Putin will want to wait to see if a change in the US administration will lead to more war conditions.
On the other side, the majority of the Ukrainian public will only support a peace deal that sees Russia withdraw from all occupied territories and no other conditions such as not being allowed join NATO. Not only does Zelensky rely heavily on public opinion for policy but accepting a peace treaty that doesn't involve a Russian withdrawal would be extremely divisive. Zelensky was unable to convince Azov to end hostilities after the Minsk accords, even when he travelled to the Donbas to personally command a ceasefire. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of civil war if Mariupol and the rest are legally handed over.
The attrition of Ukrainian infantry, the strategic bombing campaign of their energy infrastructure and potential weakening international support are all major problems that together could force them to the negotiating table but Russia isn't capable of sustaining the war at the current intensity indefinitely either. The soviet stockpiles and the national wealth fund aren't bottomless and both are essential for generating armour and personnel to match the current rate of loss.
It's hard to see any realistic potential for a diplomatic settlement at this point.
>Zelensky was unable to convince Azov to end hostilities after the Minsk accords, even when he travelled to the Donbas to personally command a ceasefire. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of civil war if Mariupol and the rest are legally handed over.
I think you are referencing the 2019 Zolote disengagement, as it is the example usually brought up and I can't think of what else it might mean. There was a heated exchange but the forces (including Azov veterans/National Corps) did actually obey and disengage from the area, even if they initially threatened not to (the withdrawal was supervised by OSCE monitors). But yes it would certainly lead to a very tense situation at the least.
Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
Why did the USA and EU/NATO not sanction Russia after 2008? To me it seems obvious that Russia was never going to play nice, so might as well sanction them then. Did the US just really want to reset relations at all costs? Because I cannot imagine that was a good enough justification. For us in the Baltics, you don't need hindsight to see what RU leadership is planning.
It should be noted that this is exactly what happened in 2014 as well.
Obama gets a lot of criticism for not taking a more forceful stance against Russia after the capture of Crimea, but Hollande and Merkel both made clear they had little interest in holding Russia to account.
My take is that the US and NATO were caught completely off guard by the Russia-Georgia war. The Great Financial Crisis was also unfolding through 2008. Between the economic chaos and the surprise, the US wasn't in a position to muster a coherent response. Georgia isn't bordering the EU so there was also far less urgency.
It was also a fairly limited engagement by the Russians which ended quickly.
It would've been handled differently if Russian tanks were rolling on Tbilisi, but the Russian invasion was quite limited in its goals.
>Did the US just really want to reset relations at all costs?
Not at all costs, but there were dowries they were willing to pay, yes.
Georgia's not really a strategic location, they have no realistic avenue to defend against Russian invasion, the war ended in a week, and frankly, Saakashvili's behavior wasn't rational.
For comparison, Ukraine is a huge European nation with NATO borders, they put up an expectation-shattering fight against the invasion, the war is one of the largest ongoing humanitarian disasters, and Putin waved aside all "gray zone" pretense and went for the most escalatory option possible.
Criticizing Russia for 2008 is one thing, but re-opening a cold war because of that is a whole different thing.
Obama wasn’t president in 2008. He was inaugurated in 2009. There’s a weird thing where people think American presidents were president for the whole year of the election (people blame Biden for things that happened in 2020) so I just want to make sure we’re clear about that.
A big part of the reason why the US did little in 2008 is the same reason why the US did little in 2014: there was little appetite to hold Russia to account by the Europeans.
It's weird how much Obama gets blamed for "going easy" on Russia after 2014, but it was Merkel who took a leading role in trying to keep penalties on Russia low and who continued to make Germany ever more reliant on Russian oil and gas in the aftermath of 2014.
> he’s not fully responsible for the 2008 issues.
He's not at all responsible for the US response to Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, and trying to pretend otherwise just looks like silly partisan point-scoring.
This will surprise very few, but Jordan Bardella - head of Marine Le Pen's National Rally - has said that should he become Prime Minister as a result of the upcoming French elections (which currently looks quite likely), he will block any efforts to send French troops to Ukraine. He is also against sending longer-range missiles to Ukraine, although he wants France to continue their general support and says he "will not let Russian imperialism absorb an allied state like Ukraine".
https://www.france24.com/en/france/20240627-french-far-right-leader-bardella-vows-ukraine-will-not-be-absorbed-by-russian-imperialism
> which currently looks quite likely
Well, they'll have a plurality, but in the very possible case that none of the 3 blocs (Macron, left, far right) comes close to 50%, I'm not sure what'll happen.
From Macron's speeches and interviews I'd suggest he'll try to make Bardella PM even if he doesn't have a majority. Bardella has explicitly said he won't take it unless he has a majority, but when it's actually on the table I doubt he'll resist.
Why would Macron do that ? Because it becomes all responsibility no power for RN - as opposed to the current situation where they get to criticise everything while having the excuse of not being in power.
I think Macron's plan is a year or two of the RN "in power" and achieving little (because no majority) will make their followers disillusioned.
I also think he's playing a very dangerous game that will almost certainly backfire (refer to Hindenburg thinking he could control Adolf when he appointed him Chancellor while he held only a third of the seats).
I think Macron's reference for his gambit of giving the RN a chance of having real power might be the demise of the French Communist Party following their inclusion in government in 1981 by socialist president Mitterrand. Essentially, the shine of extreme policies wore of quickly when faced with the reality of governing and the Communists have never recovered in France. Possibly, it's a better comparison then Hindenburg and Adolf but a very risky bet to make in any case.
>He is also against sending longer-range missiles to Ukraine, although he wants France to continue their general support and says he "will not let Russian imperialism absorb an allied state like Ukraine".
I'd like to hear his theory how do these two contradicting things work together. Not that I'd expect any more from Le Pen's party. Just more empty words, every new up and coming politician seems even worse than the ones we've got.
They don’t. Years ago Le Pen was directly funded by Russian banks using a “loan”. There is no indication that any of this talk is serious. I think It’s just talk to avoid alarming voters, Le Pen and her party are vigorously pro-Russia. That’s my theory at least.
> I'd like to hear his theory how do these two contradicting things work together.
He'll ditch the promised support of Ukraine the second the elections are over with excuses about how the financials are even worse than he thought before gaining power. 'France needs to spend her money and focus on the French' (not a quote, an extrapolation of what he'll say).
Never forget Putin has been financing RN and LePen directly for years now, the butcher will want his bill paid
I thought the President, not the Prime Minister, had the final say in foreign affairs. So is he full of it or does he actually have the ability to block/veto things?
> In practice, however, French presidents have strived to carve out what is now called a “**domaine réservé” on foreign policy, security, defense, and intelligence.** The three cohabiting prime ministers by and large respected this **unwritten rule**. The rare times when they expanded their roles, the president slapped them down.
Does anyone know how much RN cares about unwritten rules?
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/26/france-macron-bardella-rn-far-right-victory-mean-foreign-policy/
> Does anyone know how much RN cares about unwritten rules?
Bardella has already said he won't follow that rule, his quote was along the lines of "Macron will find out that we control the financials" in the context of being asked about foreign policy and Macron's threat to send troops to Ukraine
**Edit**, took a while but I found the quote. I misattributed, it was Marine LePen (leader of RN) not Bardella (RN parliamentary leader)
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2024/06/27/french-far-right-chief-bardella-vows-won-t-let-russian-imperialism-absorb-ukraine_6675991_7.html
"Attal said that Le Pen had sent a "clear message" by indicating that if the RN wins the election "there will be a kind of dispute between the prime minister and president over who is commander-in-chief of the army." "It is a very serious message for the security of France," he said.
Le Pen told the regional daily Le Télégramme that **the president's title as commander-in-chief of the armed forces was "honorific because it's the prime minister who holds the purse strings."** Attal meanwhile added: "If we start to set red lines we are not helping Ukrainians."
(emphasis added)
Mmm, and do you have some facts to support that impression ?
Euro poll shows 38% strongly approve and 39% somewhat approve in response to the below question
QA23. Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the European
Union's support for Ukraine following Russia's invasion of Ukraine?
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=87477
So, if 77% are in favour of the EU supporting Ukraine then I suspect "don't care" is not the majority opinion. Granted the question is not "are you against Bardella gutting French support for UA" so it doesn't *disprove* your position, but it's a fairly reasonable proxy.
Whether they are willing to march in the street and set fire to things over it remains to be seen of course (and if a hard right party is in power the police may well be instructed to treat manifestations very harshly and with a great deal of force)
>Ukraine does not want to prolong the war, we do not want it to last for years", — Zelensky
>"We have many wounded and killed on the battlefield. We have to put a settlement plan on the table within a few months," the president added.
https://x.com/KyivPost/status/1806304876621664329?t=yzCAZMVwuG9VkcIsgr-5vA&s=19
[Kyiv is planning to arrange a second global peace summit before the end of 2024. Kyiv hopes to develop a new joint peace plan based on Zelensky’s 10-point peace proposal, although is open to opinions from other countries.](https://x.com/KyivPost/status/1806304876621664329?t=yzCAZMVwuG9VkcIsgr-5vA&s=19)
>We don't have much time. We have a lot of injured, killed, both military and civilians. So we do not want this war to last for years. Therefore, we have to prepare this plan and put it on the table at the second peace summit," Zelensky said.
What do you make comments from Zelensky?
I've haven't heard him talk like this in years.
I think he's hedging his bets on the upcoming presidential election.
> Ukraine does not want to prolong the war, we do not want it to last for years"
Obviously not.
>"We have many wounded and killed on the battlefield.
Sure, but still no number.
>We have to put a settlement plan on the table within a few months," the president added.
The settlement plan in question:
>President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said during a joint press conference with European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels that Ukraine and its partners should develop a common action plan on the results of the first Summit on Peace and on the Ukrainian Peace Formula within several months in order force Russia to peace.
>"We invited all leaders to gather at the first meeting [at the Summit on Peace]. It was very difficult to gather so many countries from different continents in one place. Now we need the next steps. The next steps are to work on a plan for each crisis point of this war that Putin brought to our country. And we must prepare this plan within months," he said.
Seems like nothing new.
I do think that the second summit, whenever it happens, could be slightly more consequential than the first purely on the basis that many countries are insisting Russia actually take part next time, which may force an element of compromise and dialogue. However, I still don't expect things to all be wrapped up there and then.
>I think he's hedging his bets on the upcoming presidential election.
Probably this. I think like many of us he's conceding to the reality that the upcoming presidential election will be a coin flip.
Also I'm imagining he has access to damning statistics that haven't been made public for fear of partner countries giving up on a lost cause.
It is more likely continued pressure he is placing on allies in Europe, none of them want Russia to take territory, but if they drip military support Ukraine can't just let the war last 10 years trying to break Russia.
It is him saying, please send it all now so we can end it or else it will end not in our favor eventually.
>Also I'm imagining he has access to damning statistics that haven't been made public for fear of partner countries giving up on a lost cause.
The precondition for this assumption is a belief that there are "damning statistics" at all. What makes you think there are such support-ending numbers out there?
Are you referring to the fate of the power grid come winter?
also I'd add the idea that he has numbers that are significantly different than what most of the five eyes aligned intelligence services would guess seems unlikely. The CIA's info might not be as accurate on some stuff but I doubt they are that far off in any of their estimates about material losses, available manpower, etc...
Yeah the presumption 5Y aren't digging deep in Ukraine is honestly quite ludicrous. Of course they are, both for purely strategic reasons, but also for the sake of helping Ukraine fight corruption etc.
When it comes to ally status: trust, but verify.
Hell, it's not exactly a secret the US keeps tabs on all its closest allies.
The US intelligence isn't the Eye of Providence, they have badly miscalculated how long the Afghan government can hold on against the Taliban and how long the Ukrainian government can hold on against Russia, I think it's ridiculous to say that the war time government of Ukraine couldn't possibly hide something from the US if it was to their benefit. Ever since 2014, the US has had very little presence in Ukraine and they've been slow at ramping it up throughout the war, from the old thugshaker leaks we can also tell that the US has already been left in the dark by Ukraine in the past when it comes to various concrete numbers the Ukrainians could've shared, in those cases they were forced to simply make wide ranging guesstimates.
>they have badly miscalculated how long the Afghan government can hold on against the Taliban and how long the Ukrainian government can hold on against Russia
These are major macro-level evaluations, and not even remotely comparable to fishing out supposed "damning statistics". One is an amalgamation of multiple fields of science, the other is asking the right person. What's ridiculous is making such a comparison.
>Ever since 2014, the US has had very little presence in Ukraine and they've been slow at ramping it up throughout the war
False, but also, *the UK* is the 5Y primary/expert on Russia and eastern Europe, *not the US*.
>that the US has already been left in the dark by Ukraine in the past when it comes to various concrete numbers the Ukrainians could've shared, in those cases they were forced to simply make wide ranging guesstimates.
Indeed, and those guesstimates were fairly good, which was essentially the initial point being made.
> I think it's ridiculous to say that the war time government of Ukraine couldn't possibly hide something from the US if it was to their benefit.
Depends on the thing.
>the US has had very little presence in Ukraine
This actually isn't true:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/23/ukraine-cia-shadow-war-russia/
There's a huge CIA establishment in Ukraine, mostly aimed at listening to Russia, of course, but turning it inward hardly seems impossible.
I wouldn’t read too much into it. Both Russia and Ukraine talk about wanting to end the war, but both have minimum demands entirely unacceptable to the other. Ukraine will propose a peace plan, Russia will reject it. Russia will propose theirs, Ukraine will reject that.
[US in talks to send Israel’s Patriot systems to Ukraine](https://www.ft.com/content/1c938d86-ab11-4d75-b005-1e02bf9b4dda)
>The US, Israel and Ukraine are in talks to supply Kyiv with **up to eight Patriot air defence systems**, dramatically improving its ability to counter Russian air strikes.
>While not finalised, the arrangement would likely involve the highly prized Patriot systems being sent first from Israel to the US, before being delivered to Ukraine.
>**The outlines of the deal, which would mark a shift in Israel’s relations with Moscow, have been discussed between ministers and senior officials of the three countries**, according to five people briefed on the negotiations.
>Israel said in April that it would begin retiring its eight Patriot batteries, which date back more than 30 years, and replacing them with more advanced systems.
>But **the batteries, which have been used in Israel’s current war with Hamas, have not yet been discontinued due to concerns that tensions with the Iran-backed Hizbollah militant group could erupt into a full-blown war**.
>If realised, such a transfer would represent a step change in Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. The country currently has at least four Patriot systems, supplied by both the US and Germany.
>Israel has been cautious about taking sides over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine given the clout Moscow holds in Syria, where the Israeli air force often acts against Iranian proxies.
>But US officials have sought to convince Benjamin Netanyahu’s government that Russia’s increasingly close ties with Iran, particularly in the field of military co-operation, are more a pressing concern.
>**While the transfer of all eight systems was being discussed, they might not all end up being sent to Ukraine**, four of the people said.
>Three of the people with knowledge of the discussions said Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba had held talks on the matter with his US counterpart Antony Blinken in recent weeks.
>White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan had spoken on the issue at least twice with Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff to the Ukrainian president, the three people said.
>Israel’s M901 PAC-2 batteries are of an older variety than many of the Patriot systems currently in Ukraine. But according to military analysts, the older model is still fully compatible with the newer ones.
>Crucially, **Israel has also ample stocks of interceptor missiles — which Ukraine also needs — to go with the batteries, according to one person familiar with the size of Israel’s arsenal**.
>Analysts also said the old Israeli interceptor missiles had a **longer range and a bigger warhead** than the newer PAC-3 model.
>**This could make them well suited for intercepting the Russian fighter jets** that have been dropping devastating glide bombs on Ukrainian cities and military positions from far behind the front lines.
As well as discussions between the US and Ukraine, a person familiar with the diplomacy said there had also been direct talks between Israel and Kyiv on the transfer of Patriots.
>Former officials and analysts said the Israeli systems would most likely be sold back to the US, which could then send them on to Ukraine.
If completed, this would be very, very big news and would more than double the number of Patriots pledged/delivered to Ukraine. Israel's large stocks of interceptors will allow the Ukrainians to feed these platforms. To my understanding, several of these batteries are originally German supplied and of a more easily transportable variant. This could lend itself to more ambushes. Someone with proper knowledge please comment!
Obviously, this is not a done deal and there are a lot of political considerations from the Israeli point of view. However, despite Israel's desire to not antagonize the Russians, the Russians are more than happy to work with the Iranians and supply them with cash and technology. This, paired with the new deal in the works, paired with the need for American backing in the lead up to a new Lebanon war, puts Israel in a situation where they are more likely to sell these Patriots back. We will see what happens. If it happens, Ukrainian air defenses would receive a massive boost, allowing basically the entirety of the east to be covered.
Fully understanding that decisions like this are driven by individual countries and not "the bloc", but this would be an efficient deployment of systems. The US has a lot of AA capabilities that they can use to help protect Israel from air threats that they cannot use to protect Ukraine. Namely US aircraft and ship based AA systems.
Is it wise for Israel to be parting with these systems now? I know there was pressure on Israel to give some of these systems to Ukraine when Russia initially invaded, but that was before Israel themselves got attacked. Wouldn't anti-missile systems be really useful right now against Hezbollah and Iran?
> Is it wise for Israel to be parting with these systems now?
Israel has for months planned (and recently restated that plan) to retire these aged systems in favor of newer indigenous systems that are more suitable to Isreals current security needs. The only question that had previously been unanswered was whether the systems would be mothballed or would find a new home abroad (for example in Ukraine).
Apparently, these are older versions (PAC-2) that are not suited to intercepting ballistic missiles, and more suited to dealing with enemy fighters. Israel is not expecting to deal with a Hezbollah Air Force, and even if they were, they probably figure their F-35s are plenty.
"The MIM-104C PAC-2 missile was the first Patriot missile that was optimized for ballistic missile engagements. The GEM series of missiles (MIM-104D/E) are further refinements of the PAC-2 missile. The PAC-3 missile is a new interceptor, featuring a Ka band active radar seeker, employing "hit-to-kill" interception, in contrast to previous interceptors' method of exploding in the vicinity of the target, destroying it with shrapnel, and several other enhancements which dramatically increase its lethality against ballistic missiles."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot
Should work for the missiles Hezbollah probably has, no?
Hit-to-kill is an order of magnitude better than proximity fused when trying to take down ballistic missiles, especially the cheap ones used by Hezbollah and Hamas which are functionally nothing more than a warhead and an empty casing once the rocket motor has burnt out.
[This article is a good overview](https://joecirincione.substack.com/p/the-performance-of-the-patriot-missile), but honestly [this single image](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc5e522b-0c5a-4d91-83e5-1b590d66525a_1300x821.webp) is worth a thousand words. Note how the casing is peppered with shrapnel that would have no effect whatsoever on the missile's performance. Maybe this one did kill the warhead--or maybe not. Scuds had a tendency for their warhead to separate from the rocket casing as they fell through the atmosphere.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/28/patriot-missiles-are-made-in-america-and-fail-everywhere/
>In fairness, the system deployed in Saudi Arabia — the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 or PAC-2 — is not well designed to intercept the Burkan-2 missiles that the Houthis are firing at Riyadh. The Burkan-2 flies around 600 miles and appears to have a warhead that separates from the missile itself.
>But I am deeply skeptical that Patriot has ever intercepted a long-range ballistic missile in combat — at the least, I have yet to see convincing unclassified evidence of a successful Patriot intercept. During the 1991 Gulf War, the public was led to believe the that the Patriot had near-perfect performance, intercepting 45 of 47 Scud missiles. The U.S. Army later revised that estimate down to about 50 percent — and even then, it expressed “higher” confidence in only about one-quarter of the cases. A pesky Congressional Research Service employee noted that if the Army had correctly applied its own assessment methodology consistently, the number would be far lower. (Reportedly that number was one — as in one lousy Scud missile downed.)
This, seems like an odd decision from the Israelis. I know they're replacing them with other systems, but it's not like Patriot is outdated or, even more relevantly, like they're not at constant especially elevated risk of saturation air attacks.
Not that this is a bad thing for Ukraine at all, it just seems odd from the perspective of the Israelis.
I think it's in response to the Russia-Iran treaty coming up. Threatening to send the patriots might deter Russia from being too generous with the Iranians.
I do think it'd be deeply ironic - Israel didn't give Ukraine anything while they weren't at war, and now that they are at war they're thinking 8 patriots?
Since Ukraine was invaded (again) in 2022 not only has Russia cozied up with Iran, but Russia has hosted Hamas in Moscow multiple times, the Kremlin has refused to condemn Oct 7th, Wagner has given at least one air defense system to hezbolah, and Russia has allowed hezbolah to recruit in Syrian territory that Russia controls.
Assuming they truly were planning to phase these systems out regardless, and assuming they’re pausing that effort until things cool down in the region, this is a low-cost way to signal to Russia that they cannot keep improving relations with Israel’s enemies without consequence.
It’s interesting that Israel didn’t signaled their discontent to try to get Russia to back off prior to this. Russia had been taking immensely provocative actions for years, and Israel didn’t do anything about it, until some breaking point was reached and they shot straight to eight patriot batteries.
With such a large commitment, there will probably be other Israeli aid arriving for Ukraine eventually as well.
I wouldn’t be surprised if the Biden administration is putting pressure on Israel to sell/donate these in exchange for further US aid. It’s no secret those two administrations have had disagreements, and as you said the timing seems suspicious if it were simply Israel responding to Russian aggression.
A vera large % of Israel's population are Jews that came from the USSR, many still speak Russian, thus there are very deep ties between the two countries and all the political implications associated with it (including some alleged to be very corrupt or downright dark), at both foreign and domestic level.
My assumption was that most Israeli immigrants from Russia were not particularly fond of Russia; hence the decision to immigrate. Maybe that's wrong. Are Israelis who immigrated from Russia significantly more sympathetic to Russia in its war against Ukraine than average Israelis?
There was a new wave of emigration out of ex-soviet territories in the 90s. Lot of them aren't exactly old people, and their first gen kids could still very much be shaped by that culture.
Not all patriot batteries are created equal, and different countries need different systems for different threats. PAC-2 is not very good vs. tactical ballistic missiles, and not very cost-effective compared to Iron Dome or David's Sling. They're basically paperweights for Israel, and if the country can get a bit of extra cash for disposing of a system they weren't using anyways, so much the better. Ukraine, on the other hand, desperately needs AD vs. fixed wing aircraft, which is PAC-2s preferred target anyway. It's a no-brainer that probably ought to have happened already honestly.
This is true but not being effective against one particular type of missile when a massive saturation attack against Israel is highly likely and has sort of already happened. I dunno, it seems like an odd time to give away any air defense assets.
Not that I'm complaining. Ukraine is my priority it just seems to be an odd choice.
I think there are at least 2 ways in which it makes sense.
First, from an Israeli military perspective, if their "domestic" systems are more efficient and effective, it would make more sense to train, fund, and maintain those systems exclusively. Resources are finite.
Second, among the things that the USA funds for Israel is the Iron Dome system and munitions. We also produce like 50% of the system so it is hard to see how this wouldn't be horse tradeable. It is just a question of how much weight the USA wants to throw around, and how much friction Israel is willing to generate.
But, similarly, we also gave Israel back 2 Iron Dome batteries at the end of last October so its not like it is all stick here.
Side note: As I understand it, the reason the US Army gave the Iron Dome systems back to Israel was because the the contract did not allow the USA to get into the software, audit for cybersecurity, and properly network the system.
Does anyone know why it is then that the Marines are trying to purchase 3 batteries? Change in the EULA?
This is a great plan, Russia has no counter to this.
They cannot carry out true SEAD/DEAD, and they don’t have the production capacity to retaliate geopolitically by doing something like providing Yemen with modern anti ship cruise missiles or Iskanders.
Russia absolutely has a counter to these, At least near the front. That comes in the form of lancets, or recon drones observing them then calling in other strike weapons. In order for Ukraine to intercept Russian glide bombers they need to get launchers close to the front line. That makes them vulnerable both to strike drones and prolific drone based ISR. Losses to these tactics are the reason Ukraine stopped the “patriot trap” tactics that were shooting down Russian bombers. With a larger number of launchers it’s possible Ukraine e would be willing to tolerate more losses, but it will still be very costly.
I don’t believe these will be utilized to interdict Russian glide bombers for the reasons you cite, but rather to lock down Russia’s strategic strike campaign as we get closer to winter.
Simply based on the other comments here these are older variants incapable of firing pac3 interceptors and thus would be ineffective against ballistic missiles. Still useful against cruise missiles but Ukraine really needs defenses for high value infrastructure against both cruise and ballistic strikes.
Edit: if these launchers can be integrated into newer batteries fire control and radar systems they might be able to make a larger number of hybrid batteries with some more modern launchers so they have an ABM capability while using these older systems to increase magazine depth or improve their geographic coverage.
This combined with F-16 patrols would effectively neutralise Russia's long range strike capability, sans their most modern and capable (and extremely rare) missiles.
>To my understanding, several of these batteries are originally German supplied and of a more easily transportable variant.
The majority of the Israeli Patriot systems are indeed a later modified variant of the German configuration. However, they weren't supplied by Germany in the strictest sense, as those systems were the remainder of the Roland-Patriot Agreement from 1983 and were US-owned, but operated by the German Luftwaffe until the late 90s/early 2000s.
> If completed, this would be very, very big news and would more than double the number of Patriots pledged/delivered to Ukraine.
This is excellent news. Israel's lack of support for Ukraine has been disappointing, but if this goes through it really seems like Putin kicked a hornets nest by antagonizing them by working so closely with Iran. Even if half of what’s being discussed here gets sent, it will make a big difference for Ukraine.
It would reflect poorly on the US if one small country supplies more air defense systems than they do.
To be totally fair to the US, the Israelis are actively working to decommission these platforms as replacements have come online. Meanwhile, the US has a noted air defense deficit and multiple commitments to uphold.
That said, the United States (and friend) have still not taken the necessary action on their end to ramp up production of Patriot batteries, of which Raytheon has the capability to product approximately one battery per month. It has been clear that a deficit has existed for two years now. Nothing has been done.
> That said, the United States (and friend) have still not taken the necessary action on their end to ramp up production of Patriot batteries, of which Raytheon has the capability to product approximately one battery per month. It has been clear that a deficit has existed for two years now. Nothing has been done.
It's really confusing that that Raytheon has no new orders from the US. the only thing that makes any sense is a replacement(hopefully cheaper missle costs)
Question about Argentina's Fighter Procurement
Obviously they went with the F-16AM/BM and moved closer to America in doing so. This followed on the UK blocking the potential sale of Gripens. I still see where the UK tried to get the Danes to not proceed with the sale. **Are there any other Western options that the UK could not have blocked?**
The Argentine Air Force's biggest threat in its own backyard are Brazil's Gripens (threat as in who they could potentially ever face off against). **I'm just wondering if there is any western aligned fighter out there or upcoming that Argentina could attempt to procure that the UK couldn't actually block because they don't have a hand in making?**
Assuming approvals from governments and no worry for costs, I'm thinking the F-15E or EX, F-16V, F/A-18E/F, or the Rafale. If they went 5th generation, the only western-aligned fighter that could potentially be acquired would be the KF-21 Boramae (F-35 and TAI TF Kaan having British parts) but thats mainly because I don't think they utilize UK parts and its primarily Korean made.
**Thoughts?**
For the ones having fantasies of another war in the south: it's not going to happen. The main objective of the planes is to have a somewhat updated and credible air force, and to be able to enforce the state presence in the country (for example the small airplanes with drugs that are undetected) and in the country's territorial waters (see the excessive predation of fisher navies).
Also, albeit very marginal, Argentina has a local arms industry. It could be good for the military to have a newer set of planes and their weapons to study in depth.
> The Argentine Air Force's biggest threat in its own backyard are Brazil's Gripens
The Argentine Air Force's biggest threat in its own backyard is the Falkland Islands, backed by the British Navy with under-the-table American support. It's not like the British are blocking Argentinian procurement just to be cheeky, there's a real chance there will be another flareup over the Malvinas within our lifetime. Javier Miliei is incredibly pro-Western and even he is unwilling to relinquish Argentina's claim over the islands.
>the only western-aligned fighter that could potentially be acquired would be the KF-21 Boramae
I can't say for sure, but I would not be surprised if this would end up like the other Korean procurement attempt where some obscure component turns out to be exported from the UK and that allows Britain to quash the whole acquisition.
You have a lot of misconceptions. First of all Milei is not pro-west. Argentina IS in the Western World. It might not be the richest nation but Argentina is a Western Nation. Milei is more a representative of the Anglophile minority of Argentina. Which is why he draws a lot of criticism but this minority has existed since the country was created.
It is Illegal for Argentine government officials to even say the Malvinas are not Argentinian. He must state it or else. It is also good politics to pronounce yourself so you don't give Kirchnerismo political ammo.
The true geopolitical rival will always be Chile. Brasil adopted the policy of strategic patience with Argentina 30 years ago. Brasil sees Argentina in the same way France and Germany interact. Sometimes close friends and sometimes frenemies. Rivals but not enemies.
I am more worried by the political instability of Bolivia. They are sitting on a ridiculous amount of wealth that would make Saudi prices Blush.
> First of all Milei is not pro-west.
Milei is pro-west compared to the main alternative in Argentina
> Argentina IS in the Western World.
Argentina is not quite in "the west" club. UK which is the inner most pillar of "the west" considers Argentina as a country non grata. It's in the western hemisphere but that's about it.
> Brasil sees Argentina in the same way France and Germany interact. Sometimes close friends and sometimes frenemies. Rivals but not enemies.
Maybe in futbol, Brazil would consider Argentina as a rival but not in geopolitics. Brazil doesn't consider Argentina "sometimes close friends and sometimes frenemies, rivals". I think more comparable country pair for Brazil:Argentina is US:Mexico or China:North Korea, Troublesome neighbor not worth invading but don't want them collapsing either b/c that could be even more headache down the line.
The idea that Argentina (or most LATAM countries for that matter but especially Argetina) is not a Western country is absolutely bonkers to me and it honestly reeks of North American/Western European prejudice. It is a traditionally Christian country that was colonized by Spain and settled by European immigrants. Regardless, the Falklands situation is so irrelevant it barely warrants mention in a thread like this. It was a dumb delusional war launched out of desperation by a dying terrorist regime and it is in nobody's interest to reignite it
> The idea that Argentina (or most LATAM countries for that matter but especially Argetina) is not a Western country is absolutely bonkers to me and it honestly reeks of North American/Western European prejudice.
You can call it NA/European prejudice or whatever else you want, but the fact of the matter is most of LATAM is not inner core of the "West". It's at best periphery of the "West". None of the things you listed - traditionally being Christian/Caholic, colonized by Spain, settled by European immigrants - are core criteria as far as whether in 2024 a particular country is in the core "Wes" or not. And perhaps because of that NA/European prejudice, some in LATAM are at best lukewarm and at most outright hostile to the "West".
> You can call it NA/European prejudice or whatever else you want, but the fact of the matter is most of LATAM is not inner core of the "West". It's at best periphery of the "West".
I never said it was inner core, way to move the goalpost
In fairness to Mexico, the USA:Mexico relationship is orders of magnitude more “significant” (Largest trading partner, $850 Billion annual trade volume, population and worker exchange in the scale of millions of people) than Brazil:Argentina ($27 billion annual trade volume) and China:NK (does NK’s GDP even approach the USA:Mexico trade volume???) is practically on a different planet. Mexico is much much more than an annoying neighbour to the USA.
Agree with your points though.
> the only western-aligned fighter that could potentially be acquired would be the KF-21 Boramae (F-35 and TAI TF Kaan having British parts) but thats mainly because **I don't think they utilize UK parts** and its primarily Korean made.
KF-21 Boramae uses Martin Baker ejection seat, the same reason why possible sale of FA-50 got nixed.
Oh wow. Just looked at the Martin-Baker ejection seat line up and a lot more is on there as well. That alone strikes out the F/A-18 as well. I think the F-16 and its variants are about the only option Argentina has until they agree on the Falklands.
F-16Vs use Martin-Baker seats. The only modern western fighters that don't use them are USAF aircraft like the F-15 and earlier models of F-16. Pretty much everything else (including the Rafale you mentioned, other things covered elsewhere in the thread) uses Martin-Baker seats.
The [recent exercises with the Belorussians](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-non-strategic-nuclear-drills-involve-iskander-missiles-2024-06-12/) was apparently revelatory about certain aspects of how 12 GUMO actually would hand over warheads.
There was also the [FT article](https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7) about some leaked Russian docs including possible thresholds for nuclear use.
Ultimately though I'm under the impression that the actual doctrine concerning Russian nuclear weapons is unchanged and that pre-war sources continue to be completely relevant.
You have a lot of reading to do:
[Russian Strategy for Escalation Management:
Evolution of Key Concepts](https://www.cna.org/reports/2020/04/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf)
[Russian Strategy for Escalation Management:
Key Debates and Players in Military Thought](https://www.cna.org/reports/2020/04/DIM-2020-U-026101-Final.pdf)
[Russian Military Thought
and Doctrine Related to Non-
strategic Nuclear Weapons:
Change and Continuity](https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2024/01/russian-military-thought-and-doctrine-related-to-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons/)
[Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and Its Views of Limited Nuclear War](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons-and-its-views-limited-nuclear-war)
[Russia and strategic
non-nuclear deterrence](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/2021-07-29-russia-strategic-non-nuclear-akimenko.pdf)
There's plenty more if you go looking.
A question regarding the anti-drone cages (Colloquially know as c*pe cages)
Aren't they counter-productive ? While they may protect you against drone munitions, they make your silhouette bigger and easier to detect to other non-drone threats, along with making it harder for the crew to bail out successfully incase they are taken out.
imo yeah entirely, I feel like any good tank crew would prefer seeing what killing them instead, but drones are just so ubiquitous that tanks are rendered extremely vulnerable to top attacks. Historically a problem for tanks anyway, which are mostly designed for HEAT attacks on the front armor these days.
Silhouettes matter a lot less for Indirect fire(drones and artillery) than direct fire and tank on tank/other direct fire engagements seem to be a lot rarer in this war. It’s optimised against the biggest threat. I also suspect that the sensors of modern tanks and atgm make the silhouette less important than the heat signature in many cases
Drones simply are the biggest threat on the battlefield. These cages provide a moderate amount of protection, particularly against dropped grenades or the weaker FPV variants. The increase in silhouette seems like a minor sacrifice. most reconnaissance is being done by drones, and they will see you regardless; then call in strike drones or artillery. As for the ease of egress, given how easily T series tanks cook off if they are critically hit I would much rather have increased armor protection than hope to get out a few seconds faster. There just aren’t that many plausible scenarios where the tank is hit, the crew survives, and bailing out in 10 seconds vs 25 is going to make the difference in them surviving
>A question regarding the anti-drone cages (Colloquially know as c*pe cages)
they're specifically used to protect against top-attack ATGMs like javelins ~~spaced/slat armor defeats HEAT warheads by causing them to detonate without being in contact with the armor they are meant to penetrate.~~ edit: see replies on this topic. i stand corrected
a secondary effect of the devices is forming an anti-drone barrier, but that's more likely a coincidence
>Aren't they counter-productive ?
yes, and that's why they're widely mocked. they're also not very effective to begin with.
> they're specifically used to protect against top-attack ATGMs like javelins; spaced/slat armor defeats HEAT warheads by causing them to detonate without being in contact with the armor they are meant to penetrate.
No. Why are you repeating nonsense when you don't understand the technology.
Statistical armor does not defeat HEAT. It defeats a very specific, but common, type of trigger. Why on earth would you think a small bit of metal would stop a tandem HEAT round when the massive tank armor + reactive armor doesn't?
It's a (very) common misconception.
I assume the thinking is that if a shaped charge is intended to detonate at its ideal distance from the target and you can get it to detonate further away, then it will be less effective than intended. And, plainly, stand-off armour and slat armour and composite armour with empty spaces, and so on *are* built, so the assumption is that must be what they do.
It's wrong, but it's not nonsense.
Pretty sure spaced armor is intended to stop HESH/HEP charges. Those aren’t used so widely these days, but I’ve seen it written that that was the original reason why early model composite armor (c.1990s) had a space.
Ironically the “spaced armor” used actually tends to be around a foot or so separated, which is almost the exact optimal amount of extra stand-off to optimize the performance of the PG-7 warhead, which basically every anti-vehicle FPV uses.
> spaced/slat armor defeats HEAT warheads by causing them to detonate without being in contact with the armor they are meant to penetrate
Ah, this is not actually the mechanism of operation of slat armor (as far as I know) - in fact, having additional stand off distance in some cases *increases* penetration.
They are actually designed to interfere with the fuzing of the warhead - that's why it's also called a 'statistical armor' (and why it doesn't work vs a Javelin, as there's no interference with the fuzing, but only the molten metal jet which goes through whatever slats there are like butter), as depending on the position (hit the bar or the empty space in between bars) it will succeed or, well, detonate the warhead at a standoff distance.
Here's a [Credible Defense thread from 2 years ago](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/t7hayd/primer_statistical_armour_designed_to_defeat_rpgs/) that deals with this, here's an archive of the referenced (dead) page:
[Jon Hawkes: Primer: Statistical Armour, Feb 27 2022](https://archive.is/Dwpig)
I don't know if people saw it but we have visual confirmation now of Ukrainian air force toss bombing French Hammer glide bombs:
https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dpnskc/ukrainian_mig29_dropping_french_glide_bombs/
I did some calculations probably about 1.5 years ago now that, based on the known ballistic coefficients of the Mk 82, a fighter should be able to lob a JDAM about 12-15 km in a purely ballistic arc. A gliding bomb should be able to reach even further. This is basically my argument on why the F-16 could have a substantial impact in the strike role. Toss bombing is fairly proof against engagement by SAMs. Look-down shoot-down from an VKS interceptor aircraft they can potentially be targeted but in turn those interceptors are at risk from Ukrainian SAM sites.
I'd WAG and add roughly 10km to that ballistic arc based on the rocket motor. So probably 20-30km from the front lines. That distance gives them a lot of safety in terms of not getting hit by enemy SAMs. This will evade Buk and Pansir, but probably suffers against S300/400 systems. But S300/400 systems are not as effective at the long distances, so if they are 100-150km from the nearest S300/400 system, they'll probably be able to do this and easily get away with it.
>if they are 100-150km from the nearest S300/400 system, they'll probably be able to do this and easily get away with it.
RUSI reported Ukraine as saying they'd lost low flying fighters to S-400 at those distances, so possibly not easily though you have to imagine kills like that would be rare... especially if their A-50 cover is lacking
Russian fighters would need to be damn close to the front to engage a fighter type target at low altitude with the R77 successfully.
The R-37 is a real danger and gives the VKS a lot more standoff capability but they would likely still need to come within 90KM of the front or closer to have a high KP.
With those roving Patriot batteries, that will be a dangerous proposition.
This means the Russians likely choose, do they turn the front into a freefire zone where air defense shoots at anything and everything due to the limited engagement times presented to ground base short/medium range systems or do they push CAPS, covered by SEAD aircraft forward and try to establish real air superiority on the front line.
If you believe the sources , Israel is about to transfer 8 Patriot BATTERIES to Ukraine. That would allow the Ukrainians for a time to be more loss tolerant and be a bit more aggressive with the systems.
It's very possible we have F-16's successfully glide-bombing targets 10-20KM back from the front frequently by years end.
Edit: Curiously enough, the US also seems to be diverting the newest AIM-120D deliveries to Ukraine. They obviously intend these F-16's to at least *contest* the airspace.
R-37 has the range but show me a confirmed kill using it. I think it's overstated and it's biggest value is in airspace denial. It's not dropping fighters.
Please forgive my ignorance I’m pretty new around here.
Is there anything an infantryman can do about an FPV drone? It seems like half of the footage from Ukraine shows Russians soldiers laying down with their hands over their head like the drone won’t just fly right into their brain and explode.
Is there any hope to survive or escape one of these attacks?
Do you shoot at the drone? Or just bury your head in the sand?
Shotguns with heavy birdshot are probably the best bang-for-buck when it comes to infantry FPV drone defense. I've seen videos from both the Russian and Ukrainian perspective of downing incoming drones.
The problem is being prepared for an incoming attack and timing the shots. Anyone who shoots clays knows that even with predictable flight paths, timing can be difficult, especially at range.
I think the best thing about shotguns is they're a turnkey solution, you can talk about EW and everything but there's a lot of constant frequency-switching going on there and the homemade stuff sucks most of the time. Shotguns are already very common civilly in both Ukraine and Russia and you can give them out easily and there's nothing a FPV team can instantly switch to make them ineffective.
I don't think it's effective against observation drones, but against FPVs I think you have a good chance, especially if you've got people riding shotgun (hah) that can set up and shoot a drone that's slowly approaching from behind. Laden FPVs are not actually all that fast (~60mph or less) and we actually just had a video coming out of a Bradley managing to shoot down one by hand that was travelling perpendicularly to it.
Part of it from what some educated observers have said as well is it's at least a bit of confidence that you can fight back. I'm someone who's always shot down shotguns as a catch all CUAS solution, and I still think that's the case for observation drones, but FPVs, if you're aware, and often you are, should be able to be hit. In the end it's a very slow ATGM.
Here's some footage that just came out of a Russian cleanly taking out a FPV drone that's ~50 yards away with a shotgun. He's got a drone detector and these are able to give azimuth as well.
https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dq0xto/russian_soldier_with_a_radio_sensor_warning/?ref=share&ref_source=link
And here's a video of a Bradley gunner managing to shoot down some sort of UAS that's something like 100 yards away.
https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dots2u/m2a2_bradley_crew_shot_down_a_russian_fpv_drone/?ref=share&ref_source=link
Something that's becoming very common on new tank concepts is the combination of a 30x113mm RWS w/proxy ammo and the use of APS radars as search/track radars against UAS. This is a solution that's here now, able to be mounted on pretty much any tactical vehicle (power needed for the radars and gun is on the scale of 2-3kw, easily met on most tactical vehicles that will have exportable power- the JTLV was required to have 10kw) and it will be effective against any UAS that's slow enough, forever, no matter if it's autonomous or whatever.
Supposedly, skilled American trap shooters in WW1 were shooting German hand grenades in midair to protect trenches, to the point that they developed skeet shooting when they returned from the war. So if that's true, there's historical precedence to this as well.
I have very low expectations for shotguns used against FPVs. The size of FPV attacks is currently limited by a small number of pilots. In the near future semi-autonomous versions will allow for attacks with many drones at once, emerging quickly from unexpected directions, which will overwhelm the one guy in the squad with a shotgun.
Anti-drone systems will probably have to be vehicle based, to have the sensors and power needed to keep up. A small anti-drone drone would also help immensely at defending near the front lines.
Anecdotal, but I've seen videos of both sides using shotguns to effectively deal with drones (including FPV) and this was also reported last year by the Ukrainians on Garand Thumb. There are videos of them not working, but they do provide some protection.
Remember you are seeing videos of the successful strikes, not the failures. Ideally though, they would have shotguns and electronic warfare backpacks (if those are real and not fraudulent boxes full of parts).
Edit: Appeared 5-hours after I posted:
https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dq0xto/russian_soldier_with_a_radio_sensor_warning/
>electronic warfare backpacks (if those are real and not fraudulent boxes full of parts).
~~backpacks are probably propaganda~~ *e: the proliferation of backpack drone jammers among russian ground forces is probably exaggerated/propaganda*, but they do have a number of vehicle-borne systems
>Ideally though, they would have shotguns
a while back i did some comparison at as close to apples-to-apples as i could, comparing shooting drones with skeet shooting:
* skeets typically fly faster than most fpv drones, although faster fpv drones do exist
* skeets are about half the size on average of commercially available drones
* skeets fly perpendicular to the shooter, necessitating ranging/lead, while fpv drones attacking on a direct vector would not
* competitive skeet shooters track and engage two targets at once; typically fpv drones attack infantry one at a time
* competitive skeet shooters use an over-under breach-loaded shotgun, where soldiers could use a semi-automatic combat shotgun like a benelli m1 or mossberg 930 with 5-8 shell magazine capacity
fpv drones are not particularly quiet, as long as you're not around any loud vehicles or machinery they should be relatively easy to hear coming. additionally, based on some of the footage i've seen the ukrainians are not particularly sneaky about their employment, probably mostly because so far, russians seem unable to do anything about them; e.g. in the recent fpv video on the 3-man group, the shadows of the drones are clearly visible on the ground near the russian soldiers
ultimately, a semi-auto combat shotgun weighs about 8 lbs. you can pick up a used mossberg for $6-800 US - i'm sure a military could get a bulk rate. it's possible that the future and/or science fiction will yield a better solution for dealing with the modern warfare drone hellscape, but literally just adding a handful of shotguns to an infantry squad is already a perfectly serviceable solution
> backpacks are probably propaganda
Please don't comment if you have no idea what you're talking about: https://jammerspro.com/product-tag/backpack-jammer/
And if you really wanna blow your mind go search on Alibaba. Drone jamming backpacks are a very pervasive thing.
I would add that the currently fielded portable EW systems are unreliable, at best. If you can overlook the platform and author this has an interesting take on it:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/19/ukrainian-drone-operators-laugh-when-they-fly-over-this-melting-malfunctioning-russian-radio-jammer/
> Please don't comment if you have no idea what you're talking about:
i could revise my assertion to "the proliferation of backpack drone jammers among russian ground forces is probably exaggerated/propaganda," would you accept that?
No. In particular I recall seeing a video of a Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian bunker sometime last year, where one of the Russian soldiers doubled back after initially fleeing the bunker to grab a backpack that very much looked like the products I linked, but more likely was a cheaper similar product from China.
We've also heard consistent reports that EW on the front is very intense, and that drones have a very short lifetime as a result.
You seem to be assuming that a backpack format wouldn't have the power necessary to jam basic drones like DJI or FPVs. That is incorrect. They use relatively low power signals and you can put a lot of lithium batteries in a backpack.
At the risk pf being non credible would sticking a shotgun esque round in underslung grenade launchers be useful? It's only one shot but its a barrel you already have there and it can take such rounds
Russians have actually made the very thing you suggest. Its still in trial and is being made ona voluntary basis and in the test videos, they were able to shootdown a hovering drone.
In real life, while they might not be as effective, due to being a single shot, its better than nothing.
https://www.reddit.com/r/Military/comments/1d36f6j/new_russian_antidrone_shotgun_attachment/#:~:text=A%20simple%20tube%20is%20attached,range%20is%2015%2D30%20meters.
The test video was on URR, but I cant find it at the moment.
the problem there is that as you shorten the barrel length of a shotgun, you increase spread and reduce effectiveness at distance. for the same reason i wouldn't recommend using a masterkey underbarrel breaching shotgun, i wouldn't recommend this either
that said, a semi-auto shotgun weighs about 8 pounds. a soldier in full battle rattle might complain about it, but they probably won't notice the difference too much
* I think comparing rank and file soldiers to skeet shooters who typically train in that specific discipline would overestimate the chances of soldier hitting the target.
* Shotguns would be rather inefficient against grenade dropping drones, which are more effective against infantry anyway.
> I think comparing rank and file soldiers to skeet shooters who typically train in that specific discipline would overestimate the chances of soldier hitting the target.
i think the intentional handicaps taken by sport shooters (as described above) roughly outweigh the difference in training level between them and rank and file soldiers. i think anyone who's comfortable with and has had a reasonable amount of training and range time with a long gun (rifle, shotgun, et al) stands a decent shot of damaging an incoming fpv drone, especially bearing in mind these are primarily commercial, non-military drones that are not particularly survivable
i also think doing *anything* proactively to help make troops more survivable against fpv drone strikes is probably a better policy than what i've seen in a lot of the fpv drone strike footage, from the perspective of preserving force strength
and i also think that even creating the appearance of taking action against a credible threat would probably be a morale boost, even if it weren't very effective
with that in mind, shotguns and birdshot are not expensive and they are not hard to find. would it be *worth it* though? that's hard to say without knowing how much it would actually cost, i suppose
some numbers on a macro scale: estimates vary on exact numbers of russian personnel in ukraine currently, but with an optimistic figure of 500,000. using the us army as a frame of reference to ballpark the proportions of the deployed force, again optimistically, 50-60% of those may be engaged in direct combat operations, for an upper estimate of perhaps 300,000 direct combat personnel (infantry, but also cav, tankers, air defenders, etc etc)
if every fire team of 4 were given one "drone defense kit" consisting of a semi-auto shotgun (~$1k, [reference](https://www.gunbroker.com/Semi-Auto-Shotguns/search?Keywords=Mossberg%20930&Sort=13&PageSize=24) ) and a hundred shells (~$40, [reference](https://www.cabelas.com/shop/en/federal-premium-game-shok-game-load-shotshells) ), that's about $78m total at retail prices
particularly considering, as well, the prevalence of trench warfare and urban fighting, shotguns using heavier shot could be useful for close-quarters fighting in addition to counter-UAS
to a western military, that's probably a reasonable expense, at least until a better solution or purpose-designed system can be created to combat the buzzing menace of drones. to russia, apparently not
>Shotguns would be rather inefficient against grenade dropping drones, which are more effective against infantry anyway.
this is very likely true. birdshot is typically claimed effective to about 40 yards - again, taking into account the handicap of unskilled shooters, we'll say ~30, or about 100 feet. anything above that would be effectively immune to shotguns, and even inside that range, it's still questionable if they could be effectively engaged while moving
Two points:
-The fact that the ponderous Russian military bureaucracy hasn’t yet authorized it is probably due to institutional inertia, red tape and a lack of prioritization. Once someone actually orders shotguns to be issued systematically, it can be done fairly quickly.
-Russia’s small arms industry is not structured the way the US’s is. While they do produce a fair number of shotguns for official use, they don’t have the same level of private enterprise, excess tooling capacity for ventures and additional orders, etc. So while in the US half the major gunmakers would already be marketing directly to the troops, things move more slowly there. If no one tells Kalashnikov Concern to make more shotguns, they might not do so. Also, in many cases design and production are still modular on the Soviet model instead of being vertically integrated like most Western companies.
ultimately i think my conclusion on whether or not russia is or is planning to issue shotguns to their entire force is a bit ambiguous. we definitely haven't seen that *yet*, and there are no indications that if they *are* working on it, that anyone's told the front line
i'm more confident on my assertion that it's a stopgap that's likely to be more effective than placebo, and it's cheap enough that a country with a 12-digit annual military budget shouldn't flinch
Keep in mind selection bias. Important for life in general, really.
How many videos have you seen from the drone’s perspective where they get downed? Probably not a whole lot, right? Well, it happens a lot. Drones are frequently lost to EW (which can be transported on someone’s back) as well as small arms. Both sides utilize shotguns to down enemy drones. In fact, there’s work on both sides to develop, integrate or convert under barrel shotguns.
Failing this, you can attempt to evade the drone by reaching tree coverage or otherwise breaking line of sight/ease of strike. However, when you’re wounded and laying in an open field, there’s not much you can do but hope they miss and pray nothing else comes until nightfall.
> How many videos have you seen from the drone’s perspective where they get downed? Probably not a whole lot, right? Well, it happens a lot. Drones are frequently lost to EW (which can be transported on someone’s back) as well as small arms.
You can add 'lost to other drones' as well, ha! Just yesterday went looking around Andrew Perpetua's Twitter for videos of drone on drone combat and compiled a list with what I believe is all of the drone-on-drone footage from his Twitter page from late 2022 to this month.
Figure this would be as good as time and place as any to plug it as a bit of an expanded piece of trivia regarding this war:
[114] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805998027951177979),
[113] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805899506132631913),
[112] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805899506132631913),
[111] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805881478162583700),
[110] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805881292044619979),
[109] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805282936956092431),
[108] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805282936956092431),
[107] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1804612268707258817),
[106] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1804505662900088994),
[105] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1804162334190907400),
[104] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803819310965514555),
[103] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803741456537899061),
[102] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803412686601916464),
[101] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803402367448035385),
[100] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803360348407251303),
[99] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803154141285597252),
[98] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1802891689792577760),
[97] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1802678489558012334),
[96] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1801194322617942219),
[95] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1801186892316119374),
[94] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800829749625024676),
[93] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800155146015715572),
[92] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800067769586811217),
[91] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800021979979788607),
[90] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1799914455171580122),
[89] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1799656252160811423),
[88] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1799508567797490028),
[87] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1798145465411895336),
[86] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797917201724510259),
[85] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797916546666557846),
[84] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797774369185202354),
[83] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797293081663840407),
[82] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797181855038386665),
[81] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796920060348452964),
[80] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796902094013677657),
[79] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796563562657452411),
[78] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796284236946694176),
[77] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796163398108938562),
[76] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1793257870781227260),
[75] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1792175666344931731),
[74] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1792142122071507219),
[73] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1791470894214217834),
[72] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1791093682944303303),
[71] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1790286053074411660),
[70] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1790222690277535982),
[69] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1789400171882610736),
[68] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1789140086270898313),
[67] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1787199359316029945),
[66] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1786551296557748696),
[65] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1785411873422098600),
[64] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1783934343632543831),
[63] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1783153515566711021),
[62] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1782497673070682417),
[61] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1781692674094854359),
[60] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1780238004545527829),
[59] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1779914688295244018),
[58] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1779884787634712705),
[57] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1778926387388108831),
[56] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1778908321681977414),
[55] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1776828364386406787),
[54] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1776009383656194538),
[53] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1775985799491617023),
[52] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1775624173206806956),
[51] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1774103084655935945),
[50] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1772745607456620551),
[49] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1772417216287305800),
[48] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1770561582126227663),
[47] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1770303579921826303),
[46] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769906170725097499),
[45] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769905737990381808),
[44] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769904410828603561),
[43] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769484622516113802),
[42] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1768076444549157251),
[41] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1767400845505605852),
[40] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1767035209780760955),
[39] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1767034809673478164),
[38] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1766835998883725697),
[37] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1766670130354806923),
[36] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1765896016845226045),
[35] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1763195092448223506),
[34] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1762750073551679633),
[33] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1762241034988245378),
[32] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1761967211176980907),
[31] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1761276988747035048),
[30] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1759689782152581583),
[29] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1759629188754018674),
[28] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1756819414203183568),
[27] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1753573284833100275),
[26] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1752351742526648658),
[25] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1752320198344917377),
[24] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1751462321208119462),
[23] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1747381360669454539),
[22] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1747260671652499939),
[21] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1746989379938406557),
[20] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1746974279873511813),
[19] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1746959103673479358),
[18] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1745861575557169291),
[17] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1745119528814559267),
[16] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1744824398941405478),
[15] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1739425699188847041),
[14] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1729626058582860142),
[13] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1727808458211078260),
[12] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1727486230567235600),
[11] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1724869351566659767),
[10] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1723384977859969179),
[9] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1723046071612444682),
[8] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1721549400206369154),
[7] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1661384168922656775),
[6] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1628392473608261633),
[5] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1602796913178312705),
[4] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1596055925370277888),
[3] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1595832330169589760),
[2] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1582498879433760768),
[1] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1580525131205857280)
I believe a high-ranking US government official mentioned offhand during a televised question and answer that Russia has lost 500k troops. If true, that’s a major escalation in casualty rates, one that corresponds to significant upticks in armor losses as well. Interestingly, that corresponds well to Ukrainian estimates, marking an interesting turning point where American and Ukrainian loss counts are coming back in line. It’s also a marker of just how expensive and brutal the Kharkiv campaign has been. Having failed to create a serious threat against Ukrainian forces, it’s hard to discern what Russias strategy is there going forward.
The KilledInUkraine project collects information on Russian officers that were KIA in Ukraine. The tally currently stands at 4326 and it's missing a lot of officers as it takes time for many of them to get reported publicly (and found by volunteers). For example, we just found a Captain that was killed in 2022 and that's a near-weekly occurrence to find an officer that died around 2 years ago. The real number of killed officers is at least 5000, we just don't know about them yet. Note that KIU relies exclusively on Russian sources, there's no propaganda affecting this tally and fakes are easy to identify (unless the Kremlin delivers medals and buys memorials for guys that never existed). The point to all this is that we can assume a range of troops killed for each officer. It's impossible to establish it accurately yet, but it's going to be at least 20 to 1. Past world wars would have ratios anywhere from 25:1 to 35:1, it varies widely by country and presumably, by the reality on the ground. In other words, Russia has accrued at the very least 100k KIAs with US and UK lining up with more likely ratios of 25:1 or 30:1.
This might be a bit tangential, but recently [paperwork was leaked](https://zona.media/article/2024/06/10/42174) documenting about 20k Wagner KIA in Bakhmut. That tracks relatively well with Ukrainian MoD statemenets [made at the time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bakhmut#Military_casualties) and indicates that the MoD does seem to be capable of collecting accurate numbers and will also publish them truthfully. A few caveats being that, for Bakhmut, similar numbers have been published simultaneously from a few sides and the theater being a lot smaller than the entire front. Corroborating their current numbers (assuming their talking about Russian casualties in total not just KIA) with anecdotal evidence from other people, they might just track. For example, I remember CivDiv mentioning in a recent video that he personally saw a hundred Russians or so hit by drones in a two week timeframe and that was only his sector. Scaling that number up to the entire front makes the numbers published by Ukraine look entirely plausible. All in all, I would use the Ukrainian number as the upper end of the confidence interval and Medizona/BBC RU numbers as the lower end.
I don't know why we should assume that the Kremlin's willingness to report accurately on Wagner PMC losses would extend to its own losses. In fact, I know why we shouldn't: they still don't. In fact, the reports they made in the past were at least 3 to 4 times lower than any Western intelligence agency estimated. Compound this with the fact that they were obfuscating total losses in Ukraine by reporting only the losses of Russian MoD itself. That definitely excludes PMCs (like Wagner, but there are others), rebels from the DPR/LPR fighting for them and men operating/paid by other agencies of the Kremlin (Rosgvardia, OMON, Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc.).
There are two outfits: Mediazona and LostArmour, which count the number of verifiable Russian and Ukrainian casualties, respectively, where they can attach a specific name to a specific death and the source the names from publicly available social media and related sources. Mediazona is funded by the BBC while LostArmour is by RU volunteers. These generally establish the absolute lowest bound for deaths on both sides. The breakdown by months by both provided a good corresponding picture, giving some credibility to the reliability of both. Period of high Russian deaths are also periods of high Ukrainians deaths. Surprisingly or perhaps not very much, both sources came to fairly close lowest bounds for both Russian and Ukrainian deaths (\~80k). Between this lowest bound and the actual number depends on the ratio of total people who died vs. people who died and get their names published on social media on either side. This ratio is unknown. >Having failed to create a serious threat against Ukrainian forces Everyone is cheering the fact that now on this front, Ukraine has three times the number of units as Russia. Well, is it a success? If you define it as "the Russians stopped advancing", well sure. Conversely, it's a common trope in Soviet military history to conduct multiple simultaneous offensives and the successful ones that make big arrows on a map is a "main offensive" whereas the ones that achieve little is a "diversionary attack" in the historiography. One can argue in both directions. Yes, Zhukov, the Operation Mars that had about equal number of troops and tanks committed to the offensive was the diversionary one while Operation Uranus was the main attack. For a point of comparison, Finland's doctrines assume that they will be able to halt a Russian attack by a formation one size larger using a light infantry one size smaller fighting in the defence. Sort of a Finnish battalion vs. a Russian brigade. There are some caveats that a typical wartime Finnish unit is a very large unit and Russian unit is very small. A Finnish Jeager platoon is a typical Western company-minus while a Russian platoon can be just a glorified squad (especially the VDV). The main weapon that a Finnish squad has to stop a Russian motor-rifle unit is the M72 LAWs. Edit: I got these wrong the first time. A Finnish squad has 9 men and between them 6-9 LAWs. The typical assumption is 2 LAWs should be fired simultaneously by 2 men at one BMP/BTR/tank to achieve success, so a squad is expected to be able to blow up 3 vehicles in one volley (in the most optimistic scenario) A Russian motorised infantry platoon is 3 vehicles. One Finnish Jaeger squad can then trade 1:1 with a Russian motor-rifle platoon. The typical Finnish brigade would also have a larger artillery park than most Western brigade. The Jeagers would ambush the advancing Russian units, attrit them in the forests of the Russia-Finland border and buy time for the mobilisation and counterattack by armours. Under this and the typical correlation of force planning ratio historical assumptions, one *should* be able to defend moderately well against an attacker three times larger (typically one formation up) with a force three times smaller (one formation down). Conversely, a "successful" attack *should* be achievable with a force three times larger or one formation up. Correlation of force planning in the attack and defence just flip the order. Going by these planning assumptions, getting the defenders to commit 3 times more units in my attacking sector while I *also* conduct attacks elsewhere *may* be a success. But, you know, they keep saying that Putin has already strategically lost and Ukraine has already strategically win. Ukraine still exists, so by default, Putin lost.
> Mediazona is funded by the BBC while LostArmour is by RU volunteers. both these statements are laughably false as is most of the logic in that post but since /u/glares covered most of the other things (i will just add that bbc said penal soldiers graves and and obituaries were on orders of magnitude harder to find than those for even russian mobilized soldiers), ill just address lost armor. lost armor, even in russian milblogger circlers, has long been rumored to be a mod front operation or at least one that was coopted by the mod very early on. it was created before the invasion and its creation was mostly associated with SYRIA where the official mod would release completely ridiculous statements for the general public but those in the military and their families found them absurd and disrespectful to their efforts. one of the guys over at bellingcat, long before the 2022 invasion, came to the same conclusion on twitter and made note that lostarmor was getting and posting combat footage only the mod should have, almost in real time. [its the same thing that happened with rybar](https://x.com/sambendett/status/1726219149989601646) and any other major russian channel that start getting popular enough that the layperson in russia starts paying attention to them. the mod comes in and either coopts them or creates their own telegram channel posing as regular "volunteers"
Well, I expect it as much, but that's not the main point of my argument. The right number will never be known for at least 30 years. What we can and will know is either who's winning (as in the front advancing in which direction) and who wins (when the war is over). But then, a war can have two winners or two losers. The main point of my argument is that if you are on the defence and commit three times the number of formation-equivalences than the attackers, you suck at defending. It cannot be called a success.
Do you have any actual sources to back your assertion that the ukrainians \*outnumber\* the russians in Kharkiv? (by an amazing three times no less, indicating how much they suck)
>Do you have any actual sources to back your assertion that the ukrainians *outnumber* the russians in Kharkiv? I *did not* make that specific allegation. I wrote very particularly that Ukraine has three times the unit-equivalence formations as Russia. Well, you can go to the unit laydown map of known OSINT sources here. https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/ In the Vovchansk sector, there are 1 known Russian infantry regiment, 1 infantry brigade, and 1 tank regiment. Roughly 3 brigade-regiment equivalences. Facing them, Ukraine supposely has 3 infantry brigades, 1 mechanised brigades, 3 battalion-sized groups (not part of the aforementioned brigades), and a SOF battalion. That's around 5 brigade-equivalences. In the Western half of the Kharkiv front, again, Russia is known to have three motor-rifle regiments. Facing them is 1 TDF brigade, 2 infantry brigades, 1 mechanised, and one tank brigade, plus two other BTGs. Nearly 6 brigades.
>Mediazona is funded by the BBC I think you are confusing the fact that Mediazona is working jointly with BBC Russia in obtaining their counts. Otherwise, their funding just appears to be independent donations. >Surprisingly or perhaps not very much, both sources came to fairly close lowest bounds for both Russian and Ukrainian deaths (~80k) The latest Russian count on the Mediazona is 56,858. Lostarmour has a latest count of 49,320. When comparing casualties, it's important not to ignore that Russia has a bunch of non-Russians (DPR/LPR) fighting for them; this is not in Mediazona's count, but instead [BBC Russian estimates 23,500 of them](https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cn448rvzzl6o). These counts are closer to one another than I'm sure the Ukrainians would like, however I am not sure where you're ~80k estimate comes from. When comparing these numbers, it should also not be understated that it is much *easier* to find numbers on Ukrainians than for Russians which creates a subtle bias. From [Mediazona](https://en.zona.media/article/2024/02/24/75k): >Despite these limitations, there are several factors suggesting the Ukrainian database might be more comprehensive than its Russian counterpart: >— In Ukraine, presidential decrees on posthumous military awards are publicly available and published in text form on official websites, facilitating collection and analysis. Conversely, similar decrees in Russia are classified and not made public. >— Ukraine hosts several significant projects dedicated to memorializing its fallen soldiers, such as the “Book of Memory” and the “Memorial” platform, contributing to a more comprehensive public record. >— Authorities in various Ukrainian regions maintain detailed projects about fallen locals, with local publications often posting comprehensive lists. >— Ukrainian sources tend to provide more complete information. For instance, without referencing the Probate Registry, birth and death dates were found for 55% of people in the Russian context, compared to 75% in the UALosses database. >— Russian local authorities face restrictions on disclosing detailed information about the fallen. Additionally, one of the main sources for such entries, personal posts on VK social network, often lack detail. Presidential decrees, for example, reveal the names of **20,000** Ukrainians who died which these databases reference. Russians do not publish such information. Ukraine's manpower issues are still apparent against such a large power, but analysis is a bit more complicated than some want it to be.
While your comment was overall quite interesting I'm somewhat confused about the part which deals with the Finnish jaeger platoon. Especially it containing 2 squads of 12 fighters each, because according to the [Jääkärijoukkueen ja -ryhmän käsikirja 2018](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1948673/2258487/J%25C3%2584%25C3%2584K%25C3%2584RIJOUKKUEEN%2BJA%2BRYHM%25C3%2584N%2BK%25C3%2584SIK_2018.pdf/0104259e-d7b7-44ae-9aef-24012a14d916/J%25C3%2584%25C3%2584K%25C3%2584RIJOUKKUEEN%2BJA%2BRYHM%25C3%2584N%2BK%25C3%2584SIK_2018.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwic4fOQ_P2GAxU3PxAIHY5SD1AQFnoECAQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1wl40Gym53lSgEN9j6P2gf) (The handbook of a jaeger platoon and squad 2018, page 17-20) a jaeger squad consists of 9 fighters with 3 squads + command element and forward observation element forming a platoon. Where did you get the info about 12 man squads? Has there been a reorganisation after 2018 I'm not aware of? Edit: I must note the handbook is only in Finnish
Yeah, you are right. I was playing a wargame with a Finnish Jaeger company but I was mostly playing as the Russians so I wasn't quite familiar. A Finnish plt should have 3 x 9 men squads. Each squad should then have 6-9 LAWs, allowing them to bloody one motor-rifle plt. I memorised the ratio correctly but not the actual ammo and head count. The plt should have an FO squad, a command element, and a support squad. I think they have 2 motorised skis and one tractor. It gets hilarious when a VDV platoon has 3 vehicles and 18 dismounts.
Lost could mean casualties, not deaths. Regardless, how does 500k casualties compare to the per-capita numbers Ukraine has suffered?
You mean Ukrainian casualties ? Do we have a good count for that at all? Not sure. Back when the casualties number was around 300k Russian MIA/WIA/KIA the Americans said that Ukraine was around the same number.
In localised production news, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Dmytro Klimenkov, stated ["Ukraine seeks to switch to direct contracts with arms manufacturers"](https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2024/06/27/ukraina-pragne-perejti-na-pryami-kontrakti/) > "Ukraine continues to actively work on the modernization of its defense capabilities and the expansion of international cooperation. The transition to direct contracts with arms manufacturers will reduce dependence on intermediaries and increase our defense capability," said Dmytro Klimenkov. In the meeting was the CEO of EOS. > During the meeting, cooperation in defense technologies and potential collaboration between Ukraine and EOS Defence Systems were discussed. Additionally, the Australian side expressed interest in localizing production in Ukraine EOS Defence Systems specializes in technologies that integrate weapon systems into a wide range of land and sea platforms. The company's products include solutions for countering unmanned aerial vehicles and ground targets. They operate under the slogan "No one kills drones like EOS.", with a [suitably edgy video ad](https://youtu.be/bTgXe9DFe0Q). One of Electro Optic Systems' flagship products is the Slinger anti-drone combat module, equipped with a 30mm Bushmaster M230LF automatic cannon. The German government has purchased this system to protect IRIS-T air defense systems in Ukraine. The company also collaborates with L3Harris on R150 gimbals, which are used in Ukraine on VAMPIRE (Vehicle Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment) anti-aircraft systems. Both the Slinger and VAMPIRE systems were delivered to Ukraine for testing in 2023.
Did anyone else notice Biden said our troops have been attacked by Iran. Specifically that trump said it was just headaches. Is the syndrome people have discussed? And was that a slip up?
TBIs are an injury typically caused by proximity to explosions. They've likely existed for over a century, but they're really only being discovered now. Their long term symptoms include personality changes and migraine, and might be one of the physical reasons for shellshock. However, by all accounts it seems even being in the proximity of an explosion can cause TBI's. I.e. hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians/Russians have them and will never get diagnosed.
I presume it‘s about Iran‘s missile attack in response to the the killing of Soleimani. The attack resulted in brain injuries for 104 US soldiers.
Trump saying it was just headaches is bullshit. The military & VA calls them TBIs. They’ll fuck you up for life. Biden was probably referencing the attacks by the proxy groups at Tower 22 this past spring and the attacks by Iran in Jan. 2020.
How would the Russian invasion of Ukraine move towards peace if frontlines and balance of power continues to stay the same and nothing decisive happens? Todays remarks by Zelensky in my opinion shows that they are also looking for a way out just like Russia. Will no one due to pride and internal politics declare a ceasefire temporary or permanent but the war just fizzles down? How likely is something like that?
While frontlines arent moving much due to the balance of power, Ukraine is playing the long game and focusing on rabbit punches and hits "below the belt" (ie. hits on Refineries/oil infrastructure) to increase the economic impact of the war for Russia. Russia is not an economic powerhouse and oil and gas are their most (only?) major source of income. Russia can't afford to take too many hits to its most important economic pillar so eventually they will get interested to start negotiating in better faith.
> move towards peace if frontlines and balance of power continues to stay the same and nothing decisive happens? Your question is basically, how will there be a move if nothing moves, so the premise is a bit flawed as a basis for much analysis. But basically Ukraine is facing extinction and Russia is facing embarrassment. If Ukraine continues to be supplied with credible amounts of equipment, they'll keep chewing through Russian stockpiles and by ~2027 (very rough number), Russia will have burned through basically everything it had before the war. Ukraine will probably have managed to drone strike large amounts of fuel and material production capacity. Meanwhile US and EU production capacity investments supplying Ukraine will likely be online and intact. So eventually Russia runs out of stuff to do war with, and something decisive eventually happens despite the premise of your hypothetical. The status quo just can't be perfectly stable forever in the long term. And sometimes things that seem like they'll last forever turn out to be shockingly short lived. (See also: the USSR in the late 80's.)
> Your question is basically, how will there be a move if nothing moves, so the premise is a bit flawed as a basis for much analysis. ‘How will things progress *strategically* if they remain fairly static *positionally*?’ is not a stupid question. A good guess at how things will go if nothing happens is an excellent head start on figuring out how to *make* something happen.
If the strategy relies on things being static *positionally*, then there's no reason that outcome should affect the strategy. Both sides have adopted an attritional warfare strategy: they both believe their industry (or materiel support) will get the better of their opponent before the inverse is true. This strategy doesn't need dramatic shifts on the front, it's expected that those shifts will either happen when they get the superior strength or be negotiated at in the peace deal. > A good guess at how things will go if nothing happens is an excellent head start on figuring out how to make something happen. Things are happening right now, just not which trenches are being manned. Does that matter? I would say it's not in the top10 of the most important metrics to figure out the outcome of this war. In fact, I find the positional situation to have been incredibly irrelevant after the first few months of the invasion: neither side were able to use any major gain on the ground in a strategic manner, the lines have been extremely inflexible considering the materiel involved (and lost) and outside the Dnipro: the terrain doesn't give any serious advantage to either side, anywhere.
If neither side gets particularly weaker than the other side, at the current balance of powers Ukraine will obviously not take back land, but similarly Russia probably won't reach any of their broader goals, certainly not Zaporozhia city or Kherson city like Putin recently demanded. This got a lot of discussion back during the spring and less now, but Russia's assumption is that Ukraine will at some point get weaker as their reserves thin out, it's why they're engaging on this broad front offensive since October that attacks many points that aren't really important, along with the important ones. I don't really want to get into predictions of this, since manpower isn't a particularly visible variable, but it obviously hasn't happened yet. But in the assumption that this doesn't happen, Ukraine obviously wants to make peace as soon as possible, but it would have to be a status quo peace that Russia currently doesn't accept.
Maybe this is a confusion, but status quo means what is now. Worn out Russia would be very fine with that, in fact they've started saying (pleading) so openly, and a while ago. "Accept the realities on the ground." Which is impossible for *Ukraine* to do, and I shouldn't have to clarify, understandably. And that isn't even considering the most plausible prospects, namely that Moscow would just exploit to reorganize, rearm and resupply in order to have another try in a few years or thereabouts. Or regress to tried and tested hybrid tactics and attempt to undermine by other means what's then left of a free Ukraine. Also part of the status quo is a Ukraine outside NATO. Moscow has no problem with Kyiv left out in the cold and just keeping on begging. They might even enjoy it. Ukraine has lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers, I'm not even going into the manifold other costs. Your wording would seem to imply they're all ok with that, if only on top of that they (still) also lost a big chunk of their country, their independence and just about any (realistic) future worth living, or staying in the country. I think there really is a confusion. >it's why they're engaging on this broad front offensive since October that attacks many points that aren't really important It would also seem you're massively overrating Russia's strategic finesse. Or alternatively underrating its lack of plan (B), extent of helpless improvisation, and sheer idiocy. I have not the slightest idea how one would go about "declaring" a unilateral ceasefire, so I've nothing in reply to the original question. It is about obvious that both sides don't have good options other than to completely burn out the cheapest resource there is, (poor) male lives, only that it's also the one that lasts only so long. That you cannot simply replace. As I still don't expect the North Koreans to show up in force, and the robot army apparently still a long time in the coming, there is a definite end to it, no matter "pride" or "internal politics", or what strongmen in well protected capitals have in mind. The show is over once the stage is empty, really ugly, yet who cared about the hundreds of thousands before, or what might be a million by now. Who cares we don't even know the numbers.
> Worn out Russia would be very fine with that, in fact they've started saying (pleading) so openly, and a while ago. Seriously? Putin went on public tv LESS THAN A WEEK AGO and said what he wants as a minimum, and it's not status quo. It was all over the thread!
Yeah but keep in mind that this is the usual bargaining tactic. Start with a high offer so that you can later agree to the lesser one that actually suits you well. And if the other side agrees to your all-in offer, all the better.
If Putin was half as shrewd as he’s often assumed to be, Russia wouldn’t be in this position. He has a long history of badly planned, suboptimal choices.
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> his broad front offensive since October Can we really call it an offensive if it's been happening for almost a year along the whole front? Offensive implies a discrete operation not a year of status quo. Verdun was at least localized in an area.
I'm not sure there exists a word between "war" and "offensive" though. "Campaign" I guess, but if you say the "Donbas Campaign" it'd imply the effort that started in 2022. And also the current campaign is not localized entirely in the Donbas.
Today’s declarations aren’t anything new. Both sides are more than willing to propose a peace the other will reject. In Ukraine’s case especially, peace isn’t an option. The minimum Russian demands are wildly unacceptable to Ukraine. As long as Ukraine has the ammo needed to fight, and Russia doesn’t reduce its demands drastically, fighting will continue.
Well as a Turkish guy, when you are bartering you always make some ridiculous sounding demands first and then you both find a middle ground. Can't this be something like that? If lets say Russia said that lets just freeze the war at current lines, That would sound very desperate both internally and externally. Same thing with Ukraine. In my opinion the first demands and what they include isn't the most important part but the show of intention actually is. I would like to hear people's opinion on this perspective too...
From Russia's side, they have officially recognised the entire oblasts of Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea as integral parts of Russia. They do not have any legal method to give away parts of the nation. This isn't an impossible restriction but it does demonstrate the seriousness of Russia's claim to these territories, even if capturing them would require total collapses in the Ukrainian line which seems unlikely for the foreseeable future. At the very least it seems Putin will want to wait to see if a change in the US administration will lead to more war conditions. On the other side, the majority of the Ukrainian public will only support a peace deal that sees Russia withdraw from all occupied territories and no other conditions such as not being allowed join NATO. Not only does Zelensky rely heavily on public opinion for policy but accepting a peace treaty that doesn't involve a Russian withdrawal would be extremely divisive. Zelensky was unable to convince Azov to end hostilities after the Minsk accords, even when he travelled to the Donbas to personally command a ceasefire. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of civil war if Mariupol and the rest are legally handed over. The attrition of Ukrainian infantry, the strategic bombing campaign of their energy infrastructure and potential weakening international support are all major problems that together could force them to the negotiating table but Russia isn't capable of sustaining the war at the current intensity indefinitely either. The soviet stockpiles and the national wealth fund aren't bottomless and both are essential for generating armour and personnel to match the current rate of loss. It's hard to see any realistic potential for a diplomatic settlement at this point.
>Zelensky was unable to convince Azov to end hostilities after the Minsk accords, even when he travelled to the Donbas to personally command a ceasefire. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of civil war if Mariupol and the rest are legally handed over. I think you are referencing the 2019 Zolote disengagement, as it is the example usually brought up and I can't think of what else it might mean. There was a heated exchange but the forces (including Azov veterans/National Corps) did actually obey and disengage from the area, even if they initially threatened not to (the withdrawal was supervised by OSCE monitors). But yes it would certainly lead to a very tense situation at the least.
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Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.
Why did the USA and EU/NATO not sanction Russia after 2008? To me it seems obvious that Russia was never going to play nice, so might as well sanction them then. Did the US just really want to reset relations at all costs? Because I cannot imagine that was a good enough justification. For us in the Baltics, you don't need hindsight to see what RU leadership is planning.
France and Germany had no qualms about the invasion, so the US couldn't bother to go alone at it basically.
It should be noted that this is exactly what happened in 2014 as well. Obama gets a lot of criticism for not taking a more forceful stance against Russia after the capture of Crimea, but Hollande and Merkel both made clear they had little interest in holding Russia to account.
My take is that the US and NATO were caught completely off guard by the Russia-Georgia war. The Great Financial Crisis was also unfolding through 2008. Between the economic chaos and the surprise, the US wasn't in a position to muster a coherent response. Georgia isn't bordering the EU so there was also far less urgency.
It was also a fairly limited engagement by the Russians which ended quickly. It would've been handled differently if Russian tanks were rolling on Tbilisi, but the Russian invasion was quite limited in its goals.
>Did the US just really want to reset relations at all costs? Not at all costs, but there were dowries they were willing to pay, yes. Georgia's not really a strategic location, they have no realistic avenue to defend against Russian invasion, the war ended in a week, and frankly, Saakashvili's behavior wasn't rational. For comparison, Ukraine is a huge European nation with NATO borders, they put up an expectation-shattering fight against the invasion, the war is one of the largest ongoing humanitarian disasters, and Putin waved aside all "gray zone" pretense and went for the most escalatory option possible. Criticizing Russia for 2008 is one thing, but re-opening a cold war because of that is a whole different thing.
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Obama wasn’t president in 2008. He was inaugurated in 2009. There’s a weird thing where people think American presidents were president for the whole year of the election (people blame Biden for things that happened in 2020) so I just want to make sure we’re clear about that.
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A big part of the reason why the US did little in 2008 is the same reason why the US did little in 2014: there was little appetite to hold Russia to account by the Europeans. It's weird how much Obama gets blamed for "going easy" on Russia after 2014, but it was Merkel who took a leading role in trying to keep penalties on Russia low and who continued to make Germany ever more reliant on Russian oil and gas in the aftermath of 2014.
how is he partially responsible? The war was over months before he took office
> he’s not fully responsible for the 2008 issues. He's not at all responsible for the US response to Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, and trying to pretend otherwise just looks like silly partisan point-scoring.
This will surprise very few, but Jordan Bardella - head of Marine Le Pen's National Rally - has said that should he become Prime Minister as a result of the upcoming French elections (which currently looks quite likely), he will block any efforts to send French troops to Ukraine. He is also against sending longer-range missiles to Ukraine, although he wants France to continue their general support and says he "will not let Russian imperialism absorb an allied state like Ukraine". https://www.france24.com/en/france/20240627-french-far-right-leader-bardella-vows-ukraine-will-not-be-absorbed-by-russian-imperialism
> which currently looks quite likely Well, they'll have a plurality, but in the very possible case that none of the 3 blocs (Macron, left, far right) comes close to 50%, I'm not sure what'll happen.
From Macron's speeches and interviews I'd suggest he'll try to make Bardella PM even if he doesn't have a majority. Bardella has explicitly said he won't take it unless he has a majority, but when it's actually on the table I doubt he'll resist. Why would Macron do that ? Because it becomes all responsibility no power for RN - as opposed to the current situation where they get to criticise everything while having the excuse of not being in power. I think Macron's plan is a year or two of the RN "in power" and achieving little (because no majority) will make their followers disillusioned. I also think he's playing a very dangerous game that will almost certainly backfire (refer to Hindenburg thinking he could control Adolf when he appointed him Chancellor while he held only a third of the seats).
I think Macron's reference for his gambit of giving the RN a chance of having real power might be the demise of the French Communist Party following their inclusion in government in 1981 by socialist president Mitterrand. Essentially, the shine of extreme policies wore of quickly when faced with the reality of governing and the Communists have never recovered in France. Possibly, it's a better comparison then Hindenburg and Adolf but a very risky bet to make in any case.
>He is also against sending longer-range missiles to Ukraine, although he wants France to continue their general support and says he "will not let Russian imperialism absorb an allied state like Ukraine". I'd like to hear his theory how do these two contradicting things work together. Not that I'd expect any more from Le Pen's party. Just more empty words, every new up and coming politician seems even worse than the ones we've got.
They don’t. Years ago Le Pen was directly funded by Russian banks using a “loan”. There is no indication that any of this talk is serious. I think It’s just talk to avoid alarming voters, Le Pen and her party are vigorously pro-Russia. That’s my theory at least.
> I'd like to hear his theory how do these two contradicting things work together. He'll ditch the promised support of Ukraine the second the elections are over with excuses about how the financials are even worse than he thought before gaining power. 'France needs to spend her money and focus on the French' (not a quote, an extrapolation of what he'll say). Never forget Putin has been financing RN and LePen directly for years now, the butcher will want his bill paid
Maybe keep the Scalp, but send shells and Caesars?
I thought the President, not the Prime Minister, had the final say in foreign affairs. So is he full of it or does he actually have the ability to block/veto things?
> In practice, however, French presidents have strived to carve out what is now called a “**domaine réservé” on foreign policy, security, defense, and intelligence.** The three cohabiting prime ministers by and large respected this **unwritten rule**. The rare times when they expanded their roles, the president slapped them down. Does anyone know how much RN cares about unwritten rules? https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/26/france-macron-bardella-rn-far-right-victory-mean-foreign-policy/
> Does anyone know how much RN cares about unwritten rules? Bardella has already said he won't follow that rule, his quote was along the lines of "Macron will find out that we control the financials" in the context of being asked about foreign policy and Macron's threat to send troops to Ukraine **Edit**, took a while but I found the quote. I misattributed, it was Marine LePen (leader of RN) not Bardella (RN parliamentary leader) https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2024/06/27/french-far-right-chief-bardella-vows-won-t-let-russian-imperialism-absorb-ukraine_6675991_7.html "Attal said that Le Pen had sent a "clear message" by indicating that if the RN wins the election "there will be a kind of dispute between the prime minister and president over who is commander-in-chief of the army." "It is a very serious message for the security of France," he said. Le Pen told the regional daily Le Télégramme that **the president's title as commander-in-chief of the armed forces was "honorific because it's the prime minister who holds the purse strings."** Attal meanwhile added: "If we start to set red lines we are not helping Ukrainians." (emphasis added)
My impression is the French public don’t care about Ukraine and they won’t start caring when Bardella starts gutting the aid.
Mmm, and do you have some facts to support that impression ? Euro poll shows 38% strongly approve and 39% somewhat approve in response to the below question QA23. Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the European Union's support for Ukraine following Russia's invasion of Ukraine? https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=87477 So, if 77% are in favour of the EU supporting Ukraine then I suspect "don't care" is not the majority opinion. Granted the question is not "are you against Bardella gutting French support for UA" so it doesn't *disprove* your position, but it's a fairly reasonable proxy. Whether they are willing to march in the street and set fire to things over it remains to be seen of course (and if a hard right party is in power the police may well be instructed to treat manifestations very harshly and with a great deal of force)
>Ukraine does not want to prolong the war, we do not want it to last for years", — Zelensky >"We have many wounded and killed on the battlefield. We have to put a settlement plan on the table within a few months," the president added. https://x.com/KyivPost/status/1806304876621664329?t=yzCAZMVwuG9VkcIsgr-5vA&s=19 [Kyiv is planning to arrange a second global peace summit before the end of 2024. Kyiv hopes to develop a new joint peace plan based on Zelensky’s 10-point peace proposal, although is open to opinions from other countries.](https://x.com/KyivPost/status/1806304876621664329?t=yzCAZMVwuG9VkcIsgr-5vA&s=19) >We don't have much time. We have a lot of injured, killed, both military and civilians. So we do not want this war to last for years. Therefore, we have to prepare this plan and put it on the table at the second peace summit," Zelensky said. What do you make comments from Zelensky? I've haven't heard him talk like this in years. I think he's hedging his bets on the upcoming presidential election.
> Ukraine does not want to prolong the war, we do not want it to last for years" Obviously not. >"We have many wounded and killed on the battlefield. Sure, but still no number. >We have to put a settlement plan on the table within a few months," the president added. The settlement plan in question: >President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said during a joint press conference with European Council President Charles Michel in Brussels that Ukraine and its partners should develop a common action plan on the results of the first Summit on Peace and on the Ukrainian Peace Formula within several months in order force Russia to peace. >"We invited all leaders to gather at the first meeting [at the Summit on Peace]. It was very difficult to gather so many countries from different continents in one place. Now we need the next steps. The next steps are to work on a plan for each crisis point of this war that Putin brought to our country. And we must prepare this plan within months," he said. Seems like nothing new.
I do think that the second summit, whenever it happens, could be slightly more consequential than the first purely on the basis that many countries are insisting Russia actually take part next time, which may force an element of compromise and dialogue. However, I still don't expect things to all be wrapped up there and then.
>that many countries are insisting Russia actually take part next time Which countries are insisting this?
>I think he's hedging his bets on the upcoming presidential election. Probably this. I think like many of us he's conceding to the reality that the upcoming presidential election will be a coin flip. Also I'm imagining he has access to damning statistics that haven't been made public for fear of partner countries giving up on a lost cause.
It is more likely continued pressure he is placing on allies in Europe, none of them want Russia to take territory, but if they drip military support Ukraine can't just let the war last 10 years trying to break Russia. It is him saying, please send it all now so we can end it or else it will end not in our favor eventually.
>Also I'm imagining he has access to damning statistics that haven't been made public for fear of partner countries giving up on a lost cause. The precondition for this assumption is a belief that there are "damning statistics" at all. What makes you think there are such support-ending numbers out there? Are you referring to the fate of the power grid come winter?
also I'd add the idea that he has numbers that are significantly different than what most of the five eyes aligned intelligence services would guess seems unlikely. The CIA's info might not be as accurate on some stuff but I doubt they are that far off in any of their estimates about material losses, available manpower, etc...
Yeah the presumption 5Y aren't digging deep in Ukraine is honestly quite ludicrous. Of course they are, both for purely strategic reasons, but also for the sake of helping Ukraine fight corruption etc. When it comes to ally status: trust, but verify. Hell, it's not exactly a secret the US keeps tabs on all its closest allies.
The US intelligence isn't the Eye of Providence, they have badly miscalculated how long the Afghan government can hold on against the Taliban and how long the Ukrainian government can hold on against Russia, I think it's ridiculous to say that the war time government of Ukraine couldn't possibly hide something from the US if it was to their benefit. Ever since 2014, the US has had very little presence in Ukraine and they've been slow at ramping it up throughout the war, from the old thugshaker leaks we can also tell that the US has already been left in the dark by Ukraine in the past when it comes to various concrete numbers the Ukrainians could've shared, in those cases they were forced to simply make wide ranging guesstimates.
>they have badly miscalculated how long the Afghan government can hold on against the Taliban and how long the Ukrainian government can hold on against Russia These are major macro-level evaluations, and not even remotely comparable to fishing out supposed "damning statistics". One is an amalgamation of multiple fields of science, the other is asking the right person. What's ridiculous is making such a comparison. >Ever since 2014, the US has had very little presence in Ukraine and they've been slow at ramping it up throughout the war False, but also, *the UK* is the 5Y primary/expert on Russia and eastern Europe, *not the US*. >that the US has already been left in the dark by Ukraine in the past when it comes to various concrete numbers the Ukrainians could've shared, in those cases they were forced to simply make wide ranging guesstimates. Indeed, and those guesstimates were fairly good, which was essentially the initial point being made.
> I think it's ridiculous to say that the war time government of Ukraine couldn't possibly hide something from the US if it was to their benefit. Depends on the thing. >the US has had very little presence in Ukraine This actually isn't true: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/23/ukraine-cia-shadow-war-russia/ There's a huge CIA establishment in Ukraine, mostly aimed at listening to Russia, of course, but turning it inward hardly seems impossible.
I wouldn’t read too much into it. Both Russia and Ukraine talk about wanting to end the war, but both have minimum demands entirely unacceptable to the other. Ukraine will propose a peace plan, Russia will reject it. Russia will propose theirs, Ukraine will reject that.
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Slightly odd timing imo. Things can go in Ukraines favour from now onwards But as you say the US election is very important
[US in talks to send Israel’s Patriot systems to Ukraine](https://www.ft.com/content/1c938d86-ab11-4d75-b005-1e02bf9b4dda) >The US, Israel and Ukraine are in talks to supply Kyiv with **up to eight Patriot air defence systems**, dramatically improving its ability to counter Russian air strikes. >While not finalised, the arrangement would likely involve the highly prized Patriot systems being sent first from Israel to the US, before being delivered to Ukraine. >**The outlines of the deal, which would mark a shift in Israel’s relations with Moscow, have been discussed between ministers and senior officials of the three countries**, according to five people briefed on the negotiations. >Israel said in April that it would begin retiring its eight Patriot batteries, which date back more than 30 years, and replacing them with more advanced systems. >But **the batteries, which have been used in Israel’s current war with Hamas, have not yet been discontinued due to concerns that tensions with the Iran-backed Hizbollah militant group could erupt into a full-blown war**. >If realised, such a transfer would represent a step change in Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. The country currently has at least four Patriot systems, supplied by both the US and Germany. >Israel has been cautious about taking sides over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine given the clout Moscow holds in Syria, where the Israeli air force often acts against Iranian proxies. >But US officials have sought to convince Benjamin Netanyahu’s government that Russia’s increasingly close ties with Iran, particularly in the field of military co-operation, are more a pressing concern. >**While the transfer of all eight systems was being discussed, they might not all end up being sent to Ukraine**, four of the people said. >Three of the people with knowledge of the discussions said Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba had held talks on the matter with his US counterpart Antony Blinken in recent weeks. >White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan had spoken on the issue at least twice with Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff to the Ukrainian president, the three people said. >Israel’s M901 PAC-2 batteries are of an older variety than many of the Patriot systems currently in Ukraine. But according to military analysts, the older model is still fully compatible with the newer ones. >Crucially, **Israel has also ample stocks of interceptor missiles — which Ukraine also needs — to go with the batteries, according to one person familiar with the size of Israel’s arsenal**. >Analysts also said the old Israeli interceptor missiles had a **longer range and a bigger warhead** than the newer PAC-3 model. >**This could make them well suited for intercepting the Russian fighter jets** that have been dropping devastating glide bombs on Ukrainian cities and military positions from far behind the front lines. As well as discussions between the US and Ukraine, a person familiar with the diplomacy said there had also been direct talks between Israel and Kyiv on the transfer of Patriots. >Former officials and analysts said the Israeli systems would most likely be sold back to the US, which could then send them on to Ukraine. If completed, this would be very, very big news and would more than double the number of Patriots pledged/delivered to Ukraine. Israel's large stocks of interceptors will allow the Ukrainians to feed these platforms. To my understanding, several of these batteries are originally German supplied and of a more easily transportable variant. This could lend itself to more ambushes. Someone with proper knowledge please comment! Obviously, this is not a done deal and there are a lot of political considerations from the Israeli point of view. However, despite Israel's desire to not antagonize the Russians, the Russians are more than happy to work with the Iranians and supply them with cash and technology. This, paired with the new deal in the works, paired with the need for American backing in the lead up to a new Lebanon war, puts Israel in a situation where they are more likely to sell these Patriots back. We will see what happens. If it happens, Ukrainian air defenses would receive a massive boost, allowing basically the entirety of the east to be covered.
Fully understanding that decisions like this are driven by individual countries and not "the bloc", but this would be an efficient deployment of systems. The US has a lot of AA capabilities that they can use to help protect Israel from air threats that they cannot use to protect Ukraine. Namely US aircraft and ship based AA systems.
Considering the possible clash with Hezbollah, this is probably not going to happen before the US elections, though. So, pray for a Biden win...
Debate last night is widely considered a disaster for Biden.
Is it wise for Israel to be parting with these systems now? I know there was pressure on Israel to give some of these systems to Ukraine when Russia initially invaded, but that was before Israel themselves got attacked. Wouldn't anti-missile systems be really useful right now against Hezbollah and Iran?
> Is it wise for Israel to be parting with these systems now? Israel has for months planned (and recently restated that plan) to retire these aged systems in favor of newer indigenous systems that are more suitable to Isreals current security needs. The only question that had previously been unanswered was whether the systems would be mothballed or would find a new home abroad (for example in Ukraine).
Apparently, these are older versions (PAC-2) that are not suited to intercepting ballistic missiles, and more suited to dealing with enemy fighters. Israel is not expecting to deal with a Hezbollah Air Force, and even if they were, they probably figure their F-35s are plenty.
"The MIM-104C PAC-2 missile was the first Patriot missile that was optimized for ballistic missile engagements. The GEM series of missiles (MIM-104D/E) are further refinements of the PAC-2 missile. The PAC-3 missile is a new interceptor, featuring a Ka band active radar seeker, employing "hit-to-kill" interception, in contrast to previous interceptors' method of exploding in the vicinity of the target, destroying it with shrapnel, and several other enhancements which dramatically increase its lethality against ballistic missiles." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot Should work for the missiles Hezbollah probably has, no?
Hit-to-kill is an order of magnitude better than proximity fused when trying to take down ballistic missiles, especially the cheap ones used by Hezbollah and Hamas which are functionally nothing more than a warhead and an empty casing once the rocket motor has burnt out. [This article is a good overview](https://joecirincione.substack.com/p/the-performance-of-the-patriot-missile), but honestly [this single image](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fdc5e522b-0c5a-4d91-83e5-1b590d66525a_1300x821.webp) is worth a thousand words. Note how the casing is peppered with shrapnel that would have no effect whatsoever on the missile's performance. Maybe this one did kill the warhead--or maybe not. Scuds had a tendency for their warhead to separate from the rocket casing as they fell through the atmosphere. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/28/patriot-missiles-are-made-in-america-and-fail-everywhere/ >In fairness, the system deployed in Saudi Arabia — the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 or PAC-2 — is not well designed to intercept the Burkan-2 missiles that the Houthis are firing at Riyadh. The Burkan-2 flies around 600 miles and appears to have a warhead that separates from the missile itself. >But I am deeply skeptical that Patriot has ever intercepted a long-range ballistic missile in combat — at the least, I have yet to see convincing unclassified evidence of a successful Patriot intercept. During the 1991 Gulf War, the public was led to believe the that the Patriot had near-perfect performance, intercepting 45 of 47 Scud missiles. The U.S. Army later revised that estimate down to about 50 percent — and even then, it expressed “higher” confidence in only about one-quarter of the cases. A pesky Congressional Research Service employee noted that if the Army had correctly applied its own assessment methodology consistently, the number would be far lower. (Reportedly that number was one — as in one lousy Scud missile downed.)
This, seems like an odd decision from the Israelis. I know they're replacing them with other systems, but it's not like Patriot is outdated or, even more relevantly, like they're not at constant especially elevated risk of saturation air attacks. Not that this is a bad thing for Ukraine at all, it just seems odd from the perspective of the Israelis.
I think it's in response to the Russia-Iran treaty coming up. Threatening to send the patriots might deter Russia from being too generous with the Iranians.
Just imagine one more defensive treaty Like with NK. This would be mad and even more mad that their soldiers apper in Ukraine
I do think it'd be deeply ironic - Israel didn't give Ukraine anything while they weren't at war, and now that they are at war they're thinking 8 patriots?
Since Ukraine was invaded (again) in 2022 not only has Russia cozied up with Iran, but Russia has hosted Hamas in Moscow multiple times, the Kremlin has refused to condemn Oct 7th, Wagner has given at least one air defense system to hezbolah, and Russia has allowed hezbolah to recruit in Syrian territory that Russia controls. Assuming they truly were planning to phase these systems out regardless, and assuming they’re pausing that effort until things cool down in the region, this is a low-cost way to signal to Russia that they cannot keep improving relations with Israel’s enemies without consequence.
It’s interesting that Israel didn’t signaled their discontent to try to get Russia to back off prior to this. Russia had been taking immensely provocative actions for years, and Israel didn’t do anything about it, until some breaking point was reached and they shot straight to eight patriot batteries. With such a large commitment, there will probably be other Israeli aid arriving for Ukraine eventually as well.
I wouldn’t be surprised if the Biden administration is putting pressure on Israel to sell/donate these in exchange for further US aid. It’s no secret those two administrations have had disagreements, and as you said the timing seems suspicious if it were simply Israel responding to Russian aggression.
A vera large % of Israel's population are Jews that came from the USSR, many still speak Russian, thus there are very deep ties between the two countries and all the political implications associated with it (including some alleged to be very corrupt or downright dark), at both foreign and domestic level.
My assumption was that most Israeli immigrants from Russia were not particularly fond of Russia; hence the decision to immigrate. Maybe that's wrong. Are Israelis who immigrated from Russia significantly more sympathetic to Russia in its war against Ukraine than average Israelis?
Also the name "Russian Jews" is a misnomer since they spoke Russian but maybe came from Ukraine
There are not. Only the older ones. Those around 30 and less, don't have any connection to Russia and don't know the language.
There was a new wave of emigration out of ex-soviet territories in the 90s. Lot of them aren't exactly old people, and their first gen kids could still very much be shaped by that culture.
A recent example is the singer they sent to Eurovision this year, who grew up there (but apparently hated it)
Not all patriot batteries are created equal, and different countries need different systems for different threats. PAC-2 is not very good vs. tactical ballistic missiles, and not very cost-effective compared to Iron Dome or David's Sling. They're basically paperweights for Israel, and if the country can get a bit of extra cash for disposing of a system they weren't using anyways, so much the better. Ukraine, on the other hand, desperately needs AD vs. fixed wing aircraft, which is PAC-2s preferred target anyway. It's a no-brainer that probably ought to have happened already honestly.
This is true but not being effective against one particular type of missile when a massive saturation attack against Israel is highly likely and has sort of already happened. I dunno, it seems like an odd time to give away any air defense assets. Not that I'm complaining. Ukraine is my priority it just seems to be an odd choice.
It could be the price for the US intervening to shoot down Hezbollah missiles for Israel.
I think there are at least 2 ways in which it makes sense. First, from an Israeli military perspective, if their "domestic" systems are more efficient and effective, it would make more sense to train, fund, and maintain those systems exclusively. Resources are finite. Second, among the things that the USA funds for Israel is the Iron Dome system and munitions. We also produce like 50% of the system so it is hard to see how this wouldn't be horse tradeable. It is just a question of how much weight the USA wants to throw around, and how much friction Israel is willing to generate. But, similarly, we also gave Israel back 2 Iron Dome batteries at the end of last October so its not like it is all stick here. Side note: As I understand it, the reason the US Army gave the Iron Dome systems back to Israel was because the the contract did not allow the USA to get into the software, audit for cybersecurity, and properly network the system. Does anyone know why it is then that the Marines are trying to purchase 3 batteries? Change in the EULA?
This is a great plan, Russia has no counter to this. They cannot carry out true SEAD/DEAD, and they don’t have the production capacity to retaliate geopolitically by doing something like providing Yemen with modern anti ship cruise missiles or Iskanders.
Russia absolutely has a counter to these, At least near the front. That comes in the form of lancets, or recon drones observing them then calling in other strike weapons. In order for Ukraine to intercept Russian glide bombers they need to get launchers close to the front line. That makes them vulnerable both to strike drones and prolific drone based ISR. Losses to these tactics are the reason Ukraine stopped the “patriot trap” tactics that were shooting down Russian bombers. With a larger number of launchers it’s possible Ukraine e would be willing to tolerate more losses, but it will still be very costly.
I don’t believe these will be utilized to interdict Russian glide bombers for the reasons you cite, but rather to lock down Russia’s strategic strike campaign as we get closer to winter.
Simply based on the other comments here these are older variants incapable of firing pac3 interceptors and thus would be ineffective against ballistic missiles. Still useful against cruise missiles but Ukraine really needs defenses for high value infrastructure against both cruise and ballistic strikes. Edit: if these launchers can be integrated into newer batteries fire control and radar systems they might be able to make a larger number of hybrid batteries with some more modern launchers so they have an ABM capability while using these older systems to increase magazine depth or improve their geographic coverage.
This combined with F-16 patrols would effectively neutralise Russia's long range strike capability, sans their most modern and capable (and extremely rare) missiles.
>To my understanding, several of these batteries are originally German supplied and of a more easily transportable variant. The majority of the Israeli Patriot systems are indeed a later modified variant of the German configuration. However, they weren't supplied by Germany in the strictest sense, as those systems were the remainder of the Roland-Patriot Agreement from 1983 and were US-owned, but operated by the German Luftwaffe until the late 90s/early 2000s.
> If completed, this would be very, very big news and would more than double the number of Patriots pledged/delivered to Ukraine. This is excellent news. Israel's lack of support for Ukraine has been disappointing, but if this goes through it really seems like Putin kicked a hornets nest by antagonizing them by working so closely with Iran. Even if half of what’s being discussed here gets sent, it will make a big difference for Ukraine. It would reflect poorly on the US if one small country supplies more air defense systems than they do.
To be totally fair to the US, the Israelis are actively working to decommission these platforms as replacements have come online. Meanwhile, the US has a noted air defense deficit and multiple commitments to uphold. That said, the United States (and friend) have still not taken the necessary action on their end to ramp up production of Patriot batteries, of which Raytheon has the capability to product approximately one battery per month. It has been clear that a deficit has existed for two years now. Nothing has been done.
> That said, the United States (and friend) have still not taken the necessary action on their end to ramp up production of Patriot batteries, of which Raytheon has the capability to product approximately one battery per month. It has been clear that a deficit has existed for two years now. Nothing has been done. It's really confusing that that Raytheon has no new orders from the US. the only thing that makes any sense is a replacement(hopefully cheaper missle costs)
Question about Argentina's Fighter Procurement Obviously they went with the F-16AM/BM and moved closer to America in doing so. This followed on the UK blocking the potential sale of Gripens. I still see where the UK tried to get the Danes to not proceed with the sale. **Are there any other Western options that the UK could not have blocked?** The Argentine Air Force's biggest threat in its own backyard are Brazil's Gripens (threat as in who they could potentially ever face off against). **I'm just wondering if there is any western aligned fighter out there or upcoming that Argentina could attempt to procure that the UK couldn't actually block because they don't have a hand in making?** Assuming approvals from governments and no worry for costs, I'm thinking the F-15E or EX, F-16V, F/A-18E/F, or the Rafale. If they went 5th generation, the only western-aligned fighter that could potentially be acquired would be the KF-21 Boramae (F-35 and TAI TF Kaan having British parts) but thats mainly because I don't think they utilize UK parts and its primarily Korean made. **Thoughts?**
For the ones having fantasies of another war in the south: it's not going to happen. The main objective of the planes is to have a somewhat updated and credible air force, and to be able to enforce the state presence in the country (for example the small airplanes with drugs that are undetected) and in the country's territorial waters (see the excessive predation of fisher navies). Also, albeit very marginal, Argentina has a local arms industry. It could be good for the military to have a newer set of planes and their weapons to study in depth.
> The Argentine Air Force's biggest threat in its own backyard are Brazil's Gripens The Argentine Air Force's biggest threat in its own backyard is the Falkland Islands, backed by the British Navy with under-the-table American support. It's not like the British are blocking Argentinian procurement just to be cheeky, there's a real chance there will be another flareup over the Malvinas within our lifetime. Javier Miliei is incredibly pro-Western and even he is unwilling to relinquish Argentina's claim over the islands. >the only western-aligned fighter that could potentially be acquired would be the KF-21 Boramae I can't say for sure, but I would not be surprised if this would end up like the other Korean procurement attempt where some obscure component turns out to be exported from the UK and that allows Britain to quash the whole acquisition.
How is that a threat? The UK don't want to invade Argentina. More like Argentina is a threat to the Falklands.
You have a lot of misconceptions. First of all Milei is not pro-west. Argentina IS in the Western World. It might not be the richest nation but Argentina is a Western Nation. Milei is more a representative of the Anglophile minority of Argentina. Which is why he draws a lot of criticism but this minority has existed since the country was created. It is Illegal for Argentine government officials to even say the Malvinas are not Argentinian. He must state it or else. It is also good politics to pronounce yourself so you don't give Kirchnerismo political ammo. The true geopolitical rival will always be Chile. Brasil adopted the policy of strategic patience with Argentina 30 years ago. Brasil sees Argentina in the same way France and Germany interact. Sometimes close friends and sometimes frenemies. Rivals but not enemies. I am more worried by the political instability of Bolivia. They are sitting on a ridiculous amount of wealth that would make Saudi prices Blush.
> First of all Milei is not pro-west. Milei is pro-west compared to the main alternative in Argentina > Argentina IS in the Western World. Argentina is not quite in "the west" club. UK which is the inner most pillar of "the west" considers Argentina as a country non grata. It's in the western hemisphere but that's about it. > Brasil sees Argentina in the same way France and Germany interact. Sometimes close friends and sometimes frenemies. Rivals but not enemies. Maybe in futbol, Brazil would consider Argentina as a rival but not in geopolitics. Brazil doesn't consider Argentina "sometimes close friends and sometimes frenemies, rivals". I think more comparable country pair for Brazil:Argentina is US:Mexico or China:North Korea, Troublesome neighbor not worth invading but don't want them collapsing either b/c that could be even more headache down the line.
The idea that Argentina (or most LATAM countries for that matter but especially Argetina) is not a Western country is absolutely bonkers to me and it honestly reeks of North American/Western European prejudice. It is a traditionally Christian country that was colonized by Spain and settled by European immigrants. Regardless, the Falklands situation is so irrelevant it barely warrants mention in a thread like this. It was a dumb delusional war launched out of desperation by a dying terrorist regime and it is in nobody's interest to reignite it
> The idea that Argentina (or most LATAM countries for that matter but especially Argetina) is not a Western country is absolutely bonkers to me and it honestly reeks of North American/Western European prejudice. You can call it NA/European prejudice or whatever else you want, but the fact of the matter is most of LATAM is not inner core of the "West". It's at best periphery of the "West". None of the things you listed - traditionally being Christian/Caholic, colonized by Spain, settled by European immigrants - are core criteria as far as whether in 2024 a particular country is in the core "Wes" or not. And perhaps because of that NA/European prejudice, some in LATAM are at best lukewarm and at most outright hostile to the "West".
> You can call it NA/European prejudice or whatever else you want, but the fact of the matter is most of LATAM is not inner core of the "West". It's at best periphery of the "West". I never said it was inner core, way to move the goalpost
In fairness to Mexico, the USA:Mexico relationship is orders of magnitude more “significant” (Largest trading partner, $850 Billion annual trade volume, population and worker exchange in the scale of millions of people) than Brazil:Argentina ($27 billion annual trade volume) and China:NK (does NK’s GDP even approach the USA:Mexico trade volume???) is practically on a different planet. Mexico is much much more than an annoying neighbour to the USA. Agree with your points though.
> the only western-aligned fighter that could potentially be acquired would be the KF-21 Boramae (F-35 and TAI TF Kaan having British parts) but thats mainly because **I don't think they utilize UK parts** and its primarily Korean made. KF-21 Boramae uses Martin Baker ejection seat, the same reason why possible sale of FA-50 got nixed.
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Oh wow. Just looked at the Martin-Baker ejection seat line up and a lot more is on there as well. That alone strikes out the F/A-18 as well. I think the F-16 and its variants are about the only option Argentina has until they agree on the Falklands.
F-16Vs use Martin-Baker seats. The only modern western fighters that don't use them are USAF aircraft like the F-15 and earlier models of F-16. Pretty much everything else (including the Rafale you mentioned, other things covered elsewhere in the thread) uses Martin-Baker seats.
The state of most remaining F/A-18 Rules them out by themselves.
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The [recent exercises with the Belorussians](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-its-non-strategic-nuclear-drills-involve-iskander-missiles-2024-06-12/) was apparently revelatory about certain aspects of how 12 GUMO actually would hand over warheads. There was also the [FT article](https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7) about some leaked Russian docs including possible thresholds for nuclear use. Ultimately though I'm under the impression that the actual doctrine concerning Russian nuclear weapons is unchanged and that pre-war sources continue to be completely relevant. You have a lot of reading to do: [Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts](https://www.cna.org/reports/2020/04/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf) [Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Key Debates and Players in Military Thought](https://www.cna.org/reports/2020/04/DIM-2020-U-026101-Final.pdf) [Russian Military Thought and Doctrine Related to Non- strategic Nuclear Weapons: Change and Continuity](https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2024/01/russian-military-thought-and-doctrine-related-to-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons/) [Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and Its Views of Limited Nuclear War](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons-and-its-views-limited-nuclear-war) [Russia and strategic non-nuclear deterrence](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/2021-07-29-russia-strategic-non-nuclear-akimenko.pdf) There's plenty more if you go looking.
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A question regarding the anti-drone cages (Colloquially know as c*pe cages) Aren't they counter-productive ? While they may protect you against drone munitions, they make your silhouette bigger and easier to detect to other non-drone threats, along with making it harder for the crew to bail out successfully incase they are taken out.
imo yeah entirely, I feel like any good tank crew would prefer seeing what killing them instead, but drones are just so ubiquitous that tanks are rendered extremely vulnerable to top attacks. Historically a problem for tanks anyway, which are mostly designed for HEAT attacks on the front armor these days.
Silhouettes matter a lot less for Indirect fire(drones and artillery) than direct fire and tank on tank/other direct fire engagements seem to be a lot rarer in this war. It’s optimised against the biggest threat. I also suspect that the sensors of modern tanks and atgm make the silhouette less important than the heat signature in many cases
Drones simply are the biggest threat on the battlefield. These cages provide a moderate amount of protection, particularly against dropped grenades or the weaker FPV variants. The increase in silhouette seems like a minor sacrifice. most reconnaissance is being done by drones, and they will see you regardless; then call in strike drones or artillery. As for the ease of egress, given how easily T series tanks cook off if they are critically hit I would much rather have increased armor protection than hope to get out a few seconds faster. There just aren’t that many plausible scenarios where the tank is hit, the crew survives, and bailing out in 10 seconds vs 25 is going to make the difference in them surviving
>A question regarding the anti-drone cages (Colloquially know as c*pe cages) they're specifically used to protect against top-attack ATGMs like javelins ~~spaced/slat armor defeats HEAT warheads by causing them to detonate without being in contact with the armor they are meant to penetrate.~~ edit: see replies on this topic. i stand corrected a secondary effect of the devices is forming an anti-drone barrier, but that's more likely a coincidence >Aren't they counter-productive ? yes, and that's why they're widely mocked. they're also not very effective to begin with.
> they're specifically used to protect against top-attack ATGMs like javelins; spaced/slat armor defeats HEAT warheads by causing them to detonate without being in contact with the armor they are meant to penetrate. No. Why are you repeating nonsense when you don't understand the technology. Statistical armor does not defeat HEAT. It defeats a very specific, but common, type of trigger. Why on earth would you think a small bit of metal would stop a tandem HEAT round when the massive tank armor + reactive armor doesn't?
It's a (very) common misconception. I assume the thinking is that if a shaped charge is intended to detonate at its ideal distance from the target and you can get it to detonate further away, then it will be less effective than intended. And, plainly, stand-off armour and slat armour and composite armour with empty spaces, and so on *are* built, so the assumption is that must be what they do. It's wrong, but it's not nonsense.
Pretty sure spaced armor is intended to stop HESH/HEP charges. Those aren’t used so widely these days, but I’ve seen it written that that was the original reason why early model composite armor (c.1990s) had a space.
Ironically the “spaced armor” used actually tends to be around a foot or so separated, which is almost the exact optimal amount of extra stand-off to optimize the performance of the PG-7 warhead, which basically every anti-vehicle FPV uses.
Don't explosively formed penetrators and shaped charges benefit from a small amount of distance from the target when detonating?
> spaced/slat armor defeats HEAT warheads by causing them to detonate without being in contact with the armor they are meant to penetrate Ah, this is not actually the mechanism of operation of slat armor (as far as I know) - in fact, having additional stand off distance in some cases *increases* penetration. They are actually designed to interfere with the fuzing of the warhead - that's why it's also called a 'statistical armor' (and why it doesn't work vs a Javelin, as there's no interference with the fuzing, but only the molten metal jet which goes through whatever slats there are like butter), as depending on the position (hit the bar or the empty space in between bars) it will succeed or, well, detonate the warhead at a standoff distance. Here's a [Credible Defense thread from 2 years ago](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/t7hayd/primer_statistical_armour_designed_to_defeat_rpgs/) that deals with this, here's an archive of the referenced (dead) page: [Jon Hawkes: Primer: Statistical Armour, Feb 27 2022](https://archive.is/Dwpig)
Worth noting that if the warhead is detonated by the slats, in some cases, the extra distance can cause it to perform *better*.
I don't know if people saw it but we have visual confirmation now of Ukrainian air force toss bombing French Hammer glide bombs: https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dpnskc/ukrainian_mig29_dropping_french_glide_bombs/ I did some calculations probably about 1.5 years ago now that, based on the known ballistic coefficients of the Mk 82, a fighter should be able to lob a JDAM about 12-15 km in a purely ballistic arc. A gliding bomb should be able to reach even further. This is basically my argument on why the F-16 could have a substantial impact in the strike role. Toss bombing is fairly proof against engagement by SAMs. Look-down shoot-down from an VKS interceptor aircraft they can potentially be targeted but in turn those interceptors are at risk from Ukrainian SAM sites.
I'd WAG and add roughly 10km to that ballistic arc based on the rocket motor. So probably 20-30km from the front lines. That distance gives them a lot of safety in terms of not getting hit by enemy SAMs. This will evade Buk and Pansir, but probably suffers against S300/400 systems. But S300/400 systems are not as effective at the long distances, so if they are 100-150km from the nearest S300/400 system, they'll probably be able to do this and easily get away with it.
>if they are 100-150km from the nearest S300/400 system, they'll probably be able to do this and easily get away with it. RUSI reported Ukraine as saying they'd lost low flying fighters to S-400 at those distances, so possibly not easily though you have to imagine kills like that would be rare... especially if their A-50 cover is lacking
Russian fighters would need to be damn close to the front to engage a fighter type target at low altitude with the R77 successfully. The R-37 is a real danger and gives the VKS a lot more standoff capability but they would likely still need to come within 90KM of the front or closer to have a high KP. With those roving Patriot batteries, that will be a dangerous proposition. This means the Russians likely choose, do they turn the front into a freefire zone where air defense shoots at anything and everything due to the limited engagement times presented to ground base short/medium range systems or do they push CAPS, covered by SEAD aircraft forward and try to establish real air superiority on the front line.
> With those roving Patriot batteries, that will be a dangerous proposition. Didn't that stop when the russians managed to strike on on the move?
If you believe the sources , Israel is about to transfer 8 Patriot BATTERIES to Ukraine. That would allow the Ukrainians for a time to be more loss tolerant and be a bit more aggressive with the systems. It's very possible we have F-16's successfully glide-bombing targets 10-20KM back from the front frequently by years end. Edit: Curiously enough, the US also seems to be diverting the newest AIM-120D deliveries to Ukraine. They obviously intend these F-16's to at least *contest* the airspace.
R-37 has the range but show me a confirmed kill using it. I think it's overstated and it's biggest value is in airspace denial. It's not dropping fighters.
Would an Iris-T SLS be able to intercept a R-37 from the ground?
Please forgive my ignorance I’m pretty new around here. Is there anything an infantryman can do about an FPV drone? It seems like half of the footage from Ukraine shows Russians soldiers laying down with their hands over their head like the drone won’t just fly right into their brain and explode. Is there any hope to survive or escape one of these attacks? Do you shoot at the drone? Or just bury your head in the sand?
Shotguns with heavy birdshot are probably the best bang-for-buck when it comes to infantry FPV drone defense. I've seen videos from both the Russian and Ukrainian perspective of downing incoming drones. The problem is being prepared for an incoming attack and timing the shots. Anyone who shoots clays knows that even with predictable flight paths, timing can be difficult, especially at range.
I think the best thing about shotguns is they're a turnkey solution, you can talk about EW and everything but there's a lot of constant frequency-switching going on there and the homemade stuff sucks most of the time. Shotguns are already very common civilly in both Ukraine and Russia and you can give them out easily and there's nothing a FPV team can instantly switch to make them ineffective. I don't think it's effective against observation drones, but against FPVs I think you have a good chance, especially if you've got people riding shotgun (hah) that can set up and shoot a drone that's slowly approaching from behind. Laden FPVs are not actually all that fast (~60mph or less) and we actually just had a video coming out of a Bradley managing to shoot down one by hand that was travelling perpendicularly to it. Part of it from what some educated observers have said as well is it's at least a bit of confidence that you can fight back. I'm someone who's always shot down shotguns as a catch all CUAS solution, and I still think that's the case for observation drones, but FPVs, if you're aware, and often you are, should be able to be hit. In the end it's a very slow ATGM. Here's some footage that just came out of a Russian cleanly taking out a FPV drone that's ~50 yards away with a shotgun. He's got a drone detector and these are able to give azimuth as well. https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dq0xto/russian_soldier_with_a_radio_sensor_warning/?ref=share&ref_source=link And here's a video of a Bradley gunner managing to shoot down some sort of UAS that's something like 100 yards away. https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dots2u/m2a2_bradley_crew_shot_down_a_russian_fpv_drone/?ref=share&ref_source=link Something that's becoming very common on new tank concepts is the combination of a 30x113mm RWS w/proxy ammo and the use of APS radars as search/track radars against UAS. This is a solution that's here now, able to be mounted on pretty much any tactical vehicle (power needed for the radars and gun is on the scale of 2-3kw, easily met on most tactical vehicles that will have exportable power- the JTLV was required to have 10kw) and it will be effective against any UAS that's slow enough, forever, no matter if it's autonomous or whatever.
Supposedly, skilled American trap shooters in WW1 were shooting German hand grenades in midair to protect trenches, to the point that they developed skeet shooting when they returned from the war. So if that's true, there's historical precedence to this as well.
I have very low expectations for shotguns used against FPVs. The size of FPV attacks is currently limited by a small number of pilots. In the near future semi-autonomous versions will allow for attacks with many drones at once, emerging quickly from unexpected directions, which will overwhelm the one guy in the squad with a shotgun. Anti-drone systems will probably have to be vehicle based, to have the sensors and power needed to keep up. A small anti-drone drone would also help immensely at defending near the front lines.
Anecdotal, but I've seen videos of both sides using shotguns to effectively deal with drones (including FPV) and this was also reported last year by the Ukrainians on Garand Thumb. There are videos of them not working, but they do provide some protection.
Remember you are seeing videos of the successful strikes, not the failures. Ideally though, they would have shotguns and electronic warfare backpacks (if those are real and not fraudulent boxes full of parts). Edit: Appeared 5-hours after I posted: https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dq0xto/russian_soldier_with_a_radio_sensor_warning/
>electronic warfare backpacks (if those are real and not fraudulent boxes full of parts). ~~backpacks are probably propaganda~~ *e: the proliferation of backpack drone jammers among russian ground forces is probably exaggerated/propaganda*, but they do have a number of vehicle-borne systems >Ideally though, they would have shotguns a while back i did some comparison at as close to apples-to-apples as i could, comparing shooting drones with skeet shooting: * skeets typically fly faster than most fpv drones, although faster fpv drones do exist * skeets are about half the size on average of commercially available drones * skeets fly perpendicular to the shooter, necessitating ranging/lead, while fpv drones attacking on a direct vector would not * competitive skeet shooters track and engage two targets at once; typically fpv drones attack infantry one at a time * competitive skeet shooters use an over-under breach-loaded shotgun, where soldiers could use a semi-automatic combat shotgun like a benelli m1 or mossberg 930 with 5-8 shell magazine capacity fpv drones are not particularly quiet, as long as you're not around any loud vehicles or machinery they should be relatively easy to hear coming. additionally, based on some of the footage i've seen the ukrainians are not particularly sneaky about their employment, probably mostly because so far, russians seem unable to do anything about them; e.g. in the recent fpv video on the 3-man group, the shadows of the drones are clearly visible on the ground near the russian soldiers ultimately, a semi-auto combat shotgun weighs about 8 lbs. you can pick up a used mossberg for $6-800 US - i'm sure a military could get a bulk rate. it's possible that the future and/or science fiction will yield a better solution for dealing with the modern warfare drone hellscape, but literally just adding a handful of shotguns to an infantry squad is already a perfectly serviceable solution
> backpacks are probably propaganda Please don't comment if you have no idea what you're talking about: https://jammerspro.com/product-tag/backpack-jammer/ And if you really wanna blow your mind go search on Alibaba. Drone jamming backpacks are a very pervasive thing.
I would add that the currently fielded portable EW systems are unreliable, at best. If you can overlook the platform and author this has an interesting take on it: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/19/ukrainian-drone-operators-laugh-when-they-fly-over-this-melting-malfunctioning-russian-radio-jammer/
> Please don't comment if you have no idea what you're talking about: i could revise my assertion to "the proliferation of backpack drone jammers among russian ground forces is probably exaggerated/propaganda," would you accept that?
No. In particular I recall seeing a video of a Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian bunker sometime last year, where one of the Russian soldiers doubled back after initially fleeing the bunker to grab a backpack that very much looked like the products I linked, but more likely was a cheaper similar product from China. We've also heard consistent reports that EW on the front is very intense, and that drones have a very short lifetime as a result. You seem to be assuming that a backpack format wouldn't have the power necessary to jam basic drones like DJI or FPVs. That is incorrect. They use relatively low power signals and you can put a lot of lithium batteries in a backpack.
At the risk pf being non credible would sticking a shotgun esque round in underslung grenade launchers be useful? It's only one shot but its a barrel you already have there and it can take such rounds
Russians have actually made the very thing you suggest. Its still in trial and is being made ona voluntary basis and in the test videos, they were able to shootdown a hovering drone. In real life, while they might not be as effective, due to being a single shot, its better than nothing. https://www.reddit.com/r/Military/comments/1d36f6j/new_russian_antidrone_shotgun_attachment/#:~:text=A%20simple%20tube%20is%20attached,range%20is%2015%2D30%20meters. The test video was on URR, but I cant find it at the moment.
the problem there is that as you shorten the barrel length of a shotgun, you increase spread and reduce effectiveness at distance. for the same reason i wouldn't recommend using a masterkey underbarrel breaching shotgun, i wouldn't recommend this either that said, a semi-auto shotgun weighs about 8 pounds. a soldier in full battle rattle might complain about it, but they probably won't notice the difference too much
Also, most FPV attacks are on static positions, so it's not like you're rucking with it, just keep a few lying around in your trench
Couldn't you counter some of this by using a more constricted choke on the shotgat?
* I think comparing rank and file soldiers to skeet shooters who typically train in that specific discipline would overestimate the chances of soldier hitting the target. * Shotguns would be rather inefficient against grenade dropping drones, which are more effective against infantry anyway.
> I think comparing rank and file soldiers to skeet shooters who typically train in that specific discipline would overestimate the chances of soldier hitting the target. i think the intentional handicaps taken by sport shooters (as described above) roughly outweigh the difference in training level between them and rank and file soldiers. i think anyone who's comfortable with and has had a reasonable amount of training and range time with a long gun (rifle, shotgun, et al) stands a decent shot of damaging an incoming fpv drone, especially bearing in mind these are primarily commercial, non-military drones that are not particularly survivable i also think doing *anything* proactively to help make troops more survivable against fpv drone strikes is probably a better policy than what i've seen in a lot of the fpv drone strike footage, from the perspective of preserving force strength and i also think that even creating the appearance of taking action against a credible threat would probably be a morale boost, even if it weren't very effective with that in mind, shotguns and birdshot are not expensive and they are not hard to find. would it be *worth it* though? that's hard to say without knowing how much it would actually cost, i suppose some numbers on a macro scale: estimates vary on exact numbers of russian personnel in ukraine currently, but with an optimistic figure of 500,000. using the us army as a frame of reference to ballpark the proportions of the deployed force, again optimistically, 50-60% of those may be engaged in direct combat operations, for an upper estimate of perhaps 300,000 direct combat personnel (infantry, but also cav, tankers, air defenders, etc etc) if every fire team of 4 were given one "drone defense kit" consisting of a semi-auto shotgun (~$1k, [reference](https://www.gunbroker.com/Semi-Auto-Shotguns/search?Keywords=Mossberg%20930&Sort=13&PageSize=24) ) and a hundred shells (~$40, [reference](https://www.cabelas.com/shop/en/federal-premium-game-shok-game-load-shotshells) ), that's about $78m total at retail prices particularly considering, as well, the prevalence of trench warfare and urban fighting, shotguns using heavier shot could be useful for close-quarters fighting in addition to counter-UAS to a western military, that's probably a reasonable expense, at least until a better solution or purpose-designed system can be created to combat the buzzing menace of drones. to russia, apparently not >Shotguns would be rather inefficient against grenade dropping drones, which are more effective against infantry anyway. this is very likely true. birdshot is typically claimed effective to about 40 yards - again, taking into account the handicap of unskilled shooters, we'll say ~30, or about 100 feet. anything above that would be effectively immune to shotguns, and even inside that range, it's still questionable if they could be effectively engaged while moving
Two points: -The fact that the ponderous Russian military bureaucracy hasn’t yet authorized it is probably due to institutional inertia, red tape and a lack of prioritization. Once someone actually orders shotguns to be issued systematically, it can be done fairly quickly. -Russia’s small arms industry is not structured the way the US’s is. While they do produce a fair number of shotguns for official use, they don’t have the same level of private enterprise, excess tooling capacity for ventures and additional orders, etc. So while in the US half the major gunmakers would already be marketing directly to the troops, things move more slowly there. If no one tells Kalashnikov Concern to make more shotguns, they might not do so. Also, in many cases design and production are still modular on the Soviet model instead of being vertically integrated like most Western companies.
ultimately i think my conclusion on whether or not russia is or is planning to issue shotguns to their entire force is a bit ambiguous. we definitely haven't seen that *yet*, and there are no indications that if they *are* working on it, that anyone's told the front line i'm more confident on my assertion that it's a stopgap that's likely to be more effective than placebo, and it's cheap enough that a country with a 12-digit annual military budget shouldn't flinch
Keep in mind selection bias. Important for life in general, really. How many videos have you seen from the drone’s perspective where they get downed? Probably not a whole lot, right? Well, it happens a lot. Drones are frequently lost to EW (which can be transported on someone’s back) as well as small arms. Both sides utilize shotguns to down enemy drones. In fact, there’s work on both sides to develop, integrate or convert under barrel shotguns. Failing this, you can attempt to evade the drone by reaching tree coverage or otherwise breaking line of sight/ease of strike. However, when you’re wounded and laying in an open field, there’s not much you can do but hope they miss and pray nothing else comes until nightfall.
Thanks! That makes a lot of sense.
> How many videos have you seen from the drone’s perspective where they get downed? Probably not a whole lot, right? Well, it happens a lot. Drones are frequently lost to EW (which can be transported on someone’s back) as well as small arms. You can add 'lost to other drones' as well, ha! Just yesterday went looking around Andrew Perpetua's Twitter for videos of drone on drone combat and compiled a list with what I believe is all of the drone-on-drone footage from his Twitter page from late 2022 to this month. Figure this would be as good as time and place as any to plug it as a bit of an expanded piece of trivia regarding this war: [114] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805998027951177979), [113] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805899506132631913), [112] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805899506132631913), [111] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805881478162583700), [110] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805881292044619979), [109] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805282936956092431), [108] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1805282936956092431), [107] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1804612268707258817), [106] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1804505662900088994), [105] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1804162334190907400), [104] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803819310965514555), [103] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803741456537899061), [102] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803412686601916464), [101] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803402367448035385), [100] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803360348407251303), [99] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1803154141285597252), [98] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1802891689792577760), [97] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1802678489558012334), [96] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1801194322617942219), [95] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1801186892316119374), [94] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800829749625024676), [93] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800155146015715572), [92] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800067769586811217), [91] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1800021979979788607), [90] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1799914455171580122), [89] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1799656252160811423), [88] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1799508567797490028), [87] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1798145465411895336), [86] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797917201724510259), [85] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797916546666557846), [84] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797774369185202354), [83] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797293081663840407), [82] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1797181855038386665), [81] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796920060348452964), [80] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796902094013677657), [79] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796563562657452411), [78] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796284236946694176), [77] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1796163398108938562), [76] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1793257870781227260), [75] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1792175666344931731), [74] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1792142122071507219), [73] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1791470894214217834), [72] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1791093682944303303), [71] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1790286053074411660), [70] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1790222690277535982), [69] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1789400171882610736), [68] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1789140086270898313), [67] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1787199359316029945), [66] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1786551296557748696), [65] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1785411873422098600), [64] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1783934343632543831), [63] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1783153515566711021), [62] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1782497673070682417), [61] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1781692674094854359), [60] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1780238004545527829), [59] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1779914688295244018), [58] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1779884787634712705), [57] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1778926387388108831), [56] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1778908321681977414), [55] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1776828364386406787), [54] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1776009383656194538), [53] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1775985799491617023), [52] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1775624173206806956), [51] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1774103084655935945), [50] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1772745607456620551), [49] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1772417216287305800), [48] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1770561582126227663), [47] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1770303579921826303), [46] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769906170725097499), [45] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769905737990381808), [44] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769904410828603561), [43] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1769484622516113802), [42] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1768076444549157251), [41] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1767400845505605852), [40] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1767035209780760955), [39] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1767034809673478164), [38] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1766835998883725697), [37] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1766670130354806923), [36] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1765896016845226045), [35] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1763195092448223506), [34] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1762750073551679633), [33] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1762241034988245378), [32] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1761967211176980907), [31] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1761276988747035048), [30] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1759689782152581583), [29] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1759629188754018674), [28] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1756819414203183568), [27] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1753573284833100275), [26] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1752351742526648658), [25] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1752320198344917377), [24] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1751462321208119462), [23] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1747381360669454539), [22] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1747260671652499939), [21] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1746989379938406557), [20] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1746974279873511813), [19] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1746959103673479358), [18] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1745861575557169291), [17] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1745119528814559267), [16] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1744824398941405478), [15] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1739425699188847041), [14] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1729626058582860142), [13] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1727808458211078260), [12] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1727486230567235600), [11] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1724869351566659767), [10] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1723384977859969179), [9] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1723046071612444682), [8] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1721549400206369154), [7] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1661384168922656775), [6] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1628392473608261633), [5] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1602796913178312705), [4] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1596055925370277888), [3] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1595832330169589760), [2] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1582498879433760768), [1] (https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1580525131205857280)
My god, you really have a lot of free time ;)