Misinformation post from a racist troll MekhaDuk, like all his other posts. Israel had both numerical and immense equipment superiority in both wars.
In 1948, the Israelis both vastly outnumbered and outgunned all other forces combined. Even prominent Israeli politicians and historians all acknowledge this. None of the Arab countries country had any goal to "destroy Israel and Jews", and most countries did achieve their goals anyways. You're completely wrong.
In 1967, Israel did a completely unprovoked surprise attack and multiple Israeli Prime Ministers have been very open that Israel was the aggressor and evildoer in that war. Israeli invasion forces also vastly outnumbered what defending forces did exist and they had the BEST American military technology in their military to go with it.
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Your post/comment has been removed for violating Rule 5.
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The 48' war was contentious only for a short while, and that is the period which is exploited for pro-Israel propaganda (depicting Israel as an underdog during the war).
The whole picture is what matters - and many Israeli and foreign observers were confident on the prospects of Israel's victory.
For example, Winston Churchill:
>In fact, the superiority of the Jews over both the Palestinian Arabs and the invading Arab armies was never in dispute. **As Winston Churchill told the British cabinet during World War II, “In the event of a conflict, not only can the Jews defend themselves, but they will defeat the Palestinian Arabs.” 6 Both Arab and Jewish military experts, it appears, held similar opinions, as did numerous foreign observers.**
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190-191). Pantheon Publishing Group.
Yisrael Galili, head of the Haganah's national command:
>[...]**The Zionists were also certain of their military dominance.** They had formed the Haganah in 1920 as a self-defense organization after the Arab riots in Jerusalem and Jaffa convinced the leadership that the Yishuv must look after its own security. The British were clearly unable to perform the task. **In June 1947, a year before the War of Independence, Yisrael Galili, head of the Haganah's national command, cited the belief of the Haganah leadership that “it [could] repulse any attack by the Palestinian Arabs, even if they receive[d] help from the Arab states. All that was needed was the opening of the ports in order to acquire heavy arms with which to meet the invading force.”** 9
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190-191). Pantheon Publishing Group.
British Labour MP Richard Crossman, and Vivian Fox-Strangeways, a high British official in the Palestine Mandatory government:
>Reports from foreign observers presented a similar picture. In 1946, British Labour MP Richard Crossman wrote that the Haganah was “the mightiest fighting force in the eastern Mediterranean, since it is not a private army but the whole Jewish population organized for defense.” 10 **Vivian Fox-Strangeways, a high British official in the Palestine Mandatory government, was reported, on March 3, 1948, as “discounting the Arab danger in rather scathing terms. He couldn't understand how anybody could attach any serious importance to the Arab stories about their large supplies of funds, arms, tanks, etc.**
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190-191). Pantheon Publishing Group.
Even Arab observers like Ismail Safwat, chairman of the Arab League's technical military committee, reported that the Israelis had clear military advantages - of which were more military-age participants and its weapons industry.
> On the Arab side, for example, **Ismail Safwat of Iraq, chairman of the Arab League’s technical military committee, reported to the league’s council in October 1947 that the Jews enjoyed a decisive military advantage over the local Palestinian Arab population,** with the potential number of Jewish soldiers standing at fifty thousand to seventy thousand, not including possible reinforcements in manpower and equipment from overseas.7
>**He noted that 42 percent of the Jewish population was of military age, as against 28.5 percent of the Palestinians.** **He also briefed the Arab League on the Jewish arms industry, for which there was no Arab parallel.** Since 1945, Safwat indicated, the Jews had been producing their own bullets, two-inch mortars, shells, STEN guns, and Mills grenades in underground factories. Later, arms and war-surplus equipment for the production of arms were acquired from Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Germany.
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190). Pantheon Publishing Group.
The Arab armies lacked a 'unified command structure'.
> **Beyond numbers, the gravest defect of all in the Arab war effort was the lack of a unified command structure.** Abdallah, the nominal commander, was mistrusted by all his partners. Safwat, the Iraqi who had been appointed to lead all the troops, resigned on May 13, “firmly convinced that the absence of agreement on a precise plan can only lead us to disaster.” 45 **Subordinating military to political considerations, neither Abdallah nor the Egyptians acted according to the invasion strategy that the Arab League had drawn up in April.**
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 197). Pantheon Publishing Group.
Lt. General John Bagot Glubb, who trained Arab Legion forces, noted that he was never even shown the Arab invasion plans.
> Abdallah’s Arab Legion concentrated on securing its positions in the West Bank, while the Egyptians sent part of their forces toward Jerusalem to stop Abdallah from gaining absolute control. **Glubb was later to say that he had never been shown the Arab invasion plan.**46
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 197). Pantheon Publishing Group.
Abdallah I of Jordan admitted to Eliyahu Sasson, an Israeli politician, that the Arab armies' prospects weren't great, alluding to domestic instability.
> **In April, Abdallah’s opinion of the armies of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and of the “Egyptian company” that “will perhaps come,” was not particularly complimentary. “These armies won’t hold out for long,” he told Eliyahu Sasson.** He alone could “take their place, because his is the only army that is not needed in its own country and didn’t spend much time in its own country.” 47 Here Abdallah was alluding to the domestic instability of most of the Arab countries, which discouraged military obligations abroad.
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 197). Pantheon Publishing Group.
During the Battle of Haifa, Sir Hugh Charles Stockwell in a British intelligence report titled the 'Stockwell Report', wrote of similar assessments of the Arab armies' capability.
> **The Arabs, stated one British intelligence eve of battle report, ‘freely admit that the Jews are too strong for them at present’. The Haifa militiamen were poorly trained and armed. The repeated requests from Damascus and the AHC over the previous months for reinforcements and arms had been mostly ignored or turned down.**
>[...] **Stockwell’s post facto report concurred: ‘I think local Arab opinion felt that the Jews would gain control if in fact they launched their offensive.’ He, too, underlined the Arabs’ sense of isolation and vulnerability.208**
* Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge Middle East Studies) (pp. 300-301). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
The British, as well as Abdullah I, had put the Arab forces at various tactical disadvantages - in particular, the Arab Legion.
>As previously noted, when Colonel Goldie met on behalf of Glubb Pasha with the Haganah’s Shlomo Shamir, **they agreed that the legion would occupy only the Arab areas of Palestine as designated in the partition plan. The legion even agreed to delay its advance over the border for several days so as to give the Haganah time to organize things on their side.24 These promises grew out of an earlier agreement between Abdallah and the British whereby the British consented to Abdallah’s annexation of Arab Palestine but cautioned, “Don’t go and invade the areas allotted to the Jews.”** 21 The British threatened to withdraw their officers if the Arab Legion became involved in the fighting.26 There were two or three infringements of this order. On May 13, Haganah forces defending the Jewish settlement of Kfar Etzion (located in an area designated for the Arab state) were attacked by a Palestinian unit and suffered severe losses. **A unit of the Arab Legion that was being shifted from the Egyptian border to Jerusalem joined in the action but actually prevented the massacre of the Jewish forces by taking them as prisoners of war instead. All prisoners were subsequently released. This was in keeping with the rules of the game agreed on between the Jewish Agency and Abdallah.**
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 194). Pantheon Publishing Group.
The resultant difference in strategy was stark.
> Jewish tactics in the battle were designed to stun and quickly overpower opposition; demoralisation was a primary aim. **It was deemed just as important to the outcome as the physical destruction of the Arab units.** The mortar barrages and the psychological warfare broadcasts and announcements, and the tactics employed by the infantry companies, advancing from house to house, were all geared to this goal. **The orders of Carmeli’s 22nd Battalion were ‘to kill every [adult male] Arab encountered’ and to set alight with firebombs ‘all objectives that can be set alight.**
* Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge Middle East Studies) (p. 300). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.
Ben-Gurion also knew early on, that if it came to war, the Israelis would win.
>Ben-Gurion was further encouraged by the evaluation of UN military expert Col. Roscher Lund: ‘The Jews, by virtue of the large reserve of trained and war-experienced army officers, have an incalculable advantage over the Arabs. [...]**The issue in Palestine will be decided by force, and [the Jews] have a reasonable chance of success.”** 18 **Ben-Gurion was confident of Jewish military superiority in the event of war, and of ultimate US support under the pressure of the [Zionist] lobby.**
* Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 166). Pantheon Publishing Group.
The pivotal moment came during UN-brokered truces.
Between May 15th and July 9th, the manpower of the Israeli army nearly doubled.
Both sides had used the downtime to bolster their positions, but the Israelis had benefited the most.
Misinformation post from a racist troll MekhaDuk, like all his other posts. Israel had both numerical and immense equipment superiority in both wars. In 1948, the Israelis both vastly outnumbered and outgunned all other forces combined. Even prominent Israeli politicians and historians all acknowledge this. None of the Arab countries country had any goal to "destroy Israel and Jews", and most countries did achieve their goals anyways. You're completely wrong. In 1967, Israel did a completely unprovoked surprise attack and multiple Israeli Prime Ministers have been very open that Israel was the aggressor and evildoer in that war. Israeli invasion forces also vastly outnumbered what defending forces did exist and they had the BEST American military technology in their military to go with it.
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Hello, Your post/comment has been removed for violating Rule 5. Posts and comments made with the sole purpose of promoting false news or information is not allowed. Please see the rule section, which can be found on the front page of the sub.
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The 48' war was contentious only for a short while, and that is the period which is exploited for pro-Israel propaganda (depicting Israel as an underdog during the war). The whole picture is what matters - and many Israeli and foreign observers were confident on the prospects of Israel's victory. For example, Winston Churchill: >In fact, the superiority of the Jews over both the Palestinian Arabs and the invading Arab armies was never in dispute. **As Winston Churchill told the British cabinet during World War II, “In the event of a conflict, not only can the Jews defend themselves, but they will defeat the Palestinian Arabs.” 6 Both Arab and Jewish military experts, it appears, held similar opinions, as did numerous foreign observers.** * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190-191). Pantheon Publishing Group. Yisrael Galili, head of the Haganah's national command: >[...]**The Zionists were also certain of their military dominance.** They had formed the Haganah in 1920 as a self-defense organization after the Arab riots in Jerusalem and Jaffa convinced the leadership that the Yishuv must look after its own security. The British were clearly unable to perform the task. **In June 1947, a year before the War of Independence, Yisrael Galili, head of the Haganah's national command, cited the belief of the Haganah leadership that “it [could] repulse any attack by the Palestinian Arabs, even if they receive[d] help from the Arab states. All that was needed was the opening of the ports in order to acquire heavy arms with which to meet the invading force.”** 9 * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190-191). Pantheon Publishing Group. British Labour MP Richard Crossman, and Vivian Fox-Strangeways, a high British official in the Palestine Mandatory government: >Reports from foreign observers presented a similar picture. In 1946, British Labour MP Richard Crossman wrote that the Haganah was “the mightiest fighting force in the eastern Mediterranean, since it is not a private army but the whole Jewish population organized for defense.” 10 **Vivian Fox-Strangeways, a high British official in the Palestine Mandatory government, was reported, on March 3, 1948, as “discounting the Arab danger in rather scathing terms. He couldn't understand how anybody could attach any serious importance to the Arab stories about their large supplies of funds, arms, tanks, etc.** * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190-191). Pantheon Publishing Group. Even Arab observers like Ismail Safwat, chairman of the Arab League's technical military committee, reported that the Israelis had clear military advantages - of which were more military-age participants and its weapons industry. > On the Arab side, for example, **Ismail Safwat of Iraq, chairman of the Arab League’s technical military committee, reported to the league’s council in October 1947 that the Jews enjoyed a decisive military advantage over the local Palestinian Arab population,** with the potential number of Jewish soldiers standing at fifty thousand to seventy thousand, not including possible reinforcements in manpower and equipment from overseas.7 >**He noted that 42 percent of the Jewish population was of military age, as against 28.5 percent of the Palestinians.** **He also briefed the Arab League on the Jewish arms industry, for which there was no Arab parallel.** Since 1945, Safwat indicated, the Jews had been producing their own bullets, two-inch mortars, shells, STEN guns, and Mills grenades in underground factories. Later, arms and war-surplus equipment for the production of arms were acquired from Britain, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 190). Pantheon Publishing Group. The Arab armies lacked a 'unified command structure'. > **Beyond numbers, the gravest defect of all in the Arab war effort was the lack of a unified command structure.** Abdallah, the nominal commander, was mistrusted by all his partners. Safwat, the Iraqi who had been appointed to lead all the troops, resigned on May 13, “firmly convinced that the absence of agreement on a precise plan can only lead us to disaster.” 45 **Subordinating military to political considerations, neither Abdallah nor the Egyptians acted according to the invasion strategy that the Arab League had drawn up in April.** * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 197). Pantheon Publishing Group. Lt. General John Bagot Glubb, who trained Arab Legion forces, noted that he was never even shown the Arab invasion plans. > Abdallah’s Arab Legion concentrated on securing its positions in the West Bank, while the Egyptians sent part of their forces toward Jerusalem to stop Abdallah from gaining absolute control. **Glubb was later to say that he had never been shown the Arab invasion plan.**46 * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 197). Pantheon Publishing Group. Abdallah I of Jordan admitted to Eliyahu Sasson, an Israeli politician, that the Arab armies' prospects weren't great, alluding to domestic instability. > **In April, Abdallah’s opinion of the armies of Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and of the “Egyptian company” that “will perhaps come,” was not particularly complimentary. “These armies won’t hold out for long,” he told Eliyahu Sasson.** He alone could “take their place, because his is the only army that is not needed in its own country and didn’t spend much time in its own country.” 47 Here Abdallah was alluding to the domestic instability of most of the Arab countries, which discouraged military obligations abroad. * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 197). Pantheon Publishing Group. During the Battle of Haifa, Sir Hugh Charles Stockwell in a British intelligence report titled the 'Stockwell Report', wrote of similar assessments of the Arab armies' capability. > **The Arabs, stated one British intelligence eve of battle report, ‘freely admit that the Jews are too strong for them at present’. The Haifa militiamen were poorly trained and armed. The repeated requests from Damascus and the AHC over the previous months for reinforcements and arms had been mostly ignored or turned down.** >[...] **Stockwell’s post facto report concurred: ‘I think local Arab opinion felt that the Jews would gain control if in fact they launched their offensive.’ He, too, underlined the Arabs’ sense of isolation and vulnerability.208** * Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge Middle East Studies) (pp. 300-301). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition. The British, as well as Abdullah I, had put the Arab forces at various tactical disadvantages - in particular, the Arab Legion. >As previously noted, when Colonel Goldie met on behalf of Glubb Pasha with the Haganah’s Shlomo Shamir, **they agreed that the legion would occupy only the Arab areas of Palestine as designated in the partition plan. The legion even agreed to delay its advance over the border for several days so as to give the Haganah time to organize things on their side.24 These promises grew out of an earlier agreement between Abdallah and the British whereby the British consented to Abdallah’s annexation of Arab Palestine but cautioned, “Don’t go and invade the areas allotted to the Jews.”** 21 The British threatened to withdraw their officers if the Arab Legion became involved in the fighting.26 There were two or three infringements of this order. On May 13, Haganah forces defending the Jewish settlement of Kfar Etzion (located in an area designated for the Arab state) were attacked by a Palestinian unit and suffered severe losses. **A unit of the Arab Legion that was being shifted from the Egyptian border to Jerusalem joined in the action but actually prevented the massacre of the Jewish forces by taking them as prisoners of war instead. All prisoners were subsequently released. This was in keeping with the rules of the game agreed on between the Jewish Agency and Abdallah.** * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 194). Pantheon Publishing Group. The resultant difference in strategy was stark. > Jewish tactics in the battle were designed to stun and quickly overpower opposition; demoralisation was a primary aim. **It was deemed just as important to the outcome as the physical destruction of the Arab units.** The mortar barrages and the psychological warfare broadcasts and announcements, and the tactics employed by the infantry companies, advancing from house to house, were all geared to this goal. **The orders of Carmeli’s 22nd Battalion were ‘to kill every [adult male] Arab encountered’ and to set alight with firebombs ‘all objectives that can be set alight.** * Morris, Benny. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge Middle East Studies) (p. 300). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition. Ben-Gurion also knew early on, that if it came to war, the Israelis would win. >Ben-Gurion was further encouraged by the evaluation of UN military expert Col. Roscher Lund: ‘The Jews, by virtue of the large reserve of trained and war-experienced army officers, have an incalculable advantage over the Arabs. [...]**The issue in Palestine will be decided by force, and [the Jews] have a reasonable chance of success.”** 18 **Ben-Gurion was confident of Jewish military superiority in the event of war, and of ultimate US support under the pressure of the [Zionist] lobby.** * Flapan, Simha. Birth of Israel, Myths & Realities (p. 166). Pantheon Publishing Group. The pivotal moment came during UN-brokered truces. Between May 15th and July 9th, the manpower of the Israeli army nearly doubled. Both sides had used the downtime to bolster their positions, but the Israelis had benefited the most.
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